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“Currently, the agrochemical industry faces two major challenges…On 
the one hand, to pay for large development and commercialization 
costs, investors and firms that have funded GM-related technologies 
must capture a share of the return on that investment.  On the other 
hand, corporations and regulators must also ensure that the new traits 
and varieties created do not impose risks or liabilities that offset (or 
swamp) the value generated.  At the farm level, in particular, there is 
significant risk of profit reduction and for co-mingling of plants with 
new traits with other crops, creating potential new liabilities.”  
-- Smyth, S., G. G. Khachatourians & P.W.B. Phillips, 
“Liabilities and economics of transgenic crops,” 




This report examines potential impacts on export markets and prices from commercializing GMO 
hard red spring wheat in the U.S. within the next two to six years.  GMO crop technology offers 
possible large benefits to consumers in the future, if plant-breeding concepts in the development 
stage materialize.  For the short run, however, there is much evidence suggesting that the majority of 
foreign consumers have serious reservations about purchasing food products made from GMO 
wheat.  Many foreign consumers see nothing to be gained from buying food produced with these 
types of wheat.  Many have questions about the long-term safety of GMO crops, which may not 
have scientific validity.  With or without scientific validity, consumer attitudes determine buying 
patterns when GMO food labeling programs are present, as they are in many foreign markets for 
wheat.  Potential accidental co-mingling would put both U.S. durum and other spring wheat exports 
at risk even if only GMO hard red spring wheat were commercialized.  With a substantial loss of 
export markets, excess U.S. production capacity for durum and other spring wheat would be 
expected to quickly depress prices for these classes to feed-wheat levels. 
 
* The author wishes to acknowledge reviews of earlier drafts and helpful suggestions from Drs. Neil Harl, 
Roger Ginder, and Michael Duffy (Distinguished Professor, Professor, and Professor), Economics 
Department, Iowa State University, Dr. Dan O’Brien, Associate Professor and Kansas State University 
Agricultural Economist, Dr. George Flaskerud, Professor, North Dakota State University Department of 
Agricultural Economics, and Dan Hiller, retired commodity specialist from Royal Bank of Canada Dominion 
Securities, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada.   Note: In May 2004, Monsanto decided not to commercialize this 
type of wheat because of foreign consumer resistance. 
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For the longer term, Biotechnology offers potential large benefits from improved agricultural 
productivity, consumer health and nutrition, and greater efficiency in grain processing if concepts 
currently in the planning and research stages materialize.  Potential benefits of biotechnology include 
plants with increased resistance to pests, diseases, drought, extreme temperatures, saline soils, and 
plant products with improved nutrition, cancer-resistance properties, and ability to reduce the risk of 
heart disease, as well as pharmaceutical crops for producing medicine. 
 
U.S. farmers have rapidly adopted Genetically Modified (GMO) soybeans and cotton in the last few 
years, because of their ability to simplify weed control, and to reduce the cost of controlling insect 
pests in cotton.  GMO corn has been much less extensively used, but is an important new technology 
in areas with serious insect and weed-control problems.  GMO canola is widely used in Canada. 
History and economic analyses indicate that the major gainers from GMO crops in the longer run 
will be (1) producers of the seed and (2) consumers, through lower food costs and possible increased 
food quality.  If the expected agricultural productivity gains materialize, early adopting producers 
may experience some temporary economic gains (depending on cost of the seed and speed with 
which the new technology is adopted), but over time will have declining prices to offset potential 
reduced costs, as global production increases. 
 
 
The Marketing Challenge for GMO Wheat 
 
For the short term (two to six years), the spring wheat industry faces a serious GMO marketing 
challenge that affects not only farmers and the seed industry, but all businesses related to the spring 
wheat industry as well as rural communities, local governments, foreign food processors, retailers 
and consumers, and very possibly U.S. producers of other classes of wheat and feed grains.  Round-
Up® herbicide resistant hard red spring wheat (HRS) has been developed and may be offered for 
commercial production some time in the next few years.  Its developer has applied for de-regulation 
in the U.S. and Canada, but has indicated it does not expect to immediately begin selling Round-
Up® Ready wheat because of uncertainty about export market acceptance.  The evidence of a major 
marketing challenge comes from surveys and other indicators of foreign consumer demand that 
suggest a large majority of foreign consumers and wheat buyers do not want GMO wheat at this 
time.  Unlike those in the U.S., overseas marketing mechanisms in many countries offer consumers a 
choice of food products made from GMO vs. non-GMO grain. 
 
Wheat is different in several major respects from corn and soybeans, where substantial U.S. 
exports continue despite widespread GMO production.  Spring wheat is a food grain, with dominant 
markets being direct human consumption rather than livestock feeding.  Processing through 
 livestock or removal of GMO protein by processing into vegetable oils and sweeteners has allowed 
much of the U.S. corn and soybean production, as well as Canadian canola, to avoid foreign GMO 
food labeling programs.  This almost certainly will not be the case for spring wheat since its main 
use is for direct human consumption.  Also, the U.S. produces a much smaller percent of the total 
world wheat crop (eight percent in 2002) and has a much smaller share of world exports than is the 
case for corn and soybeans.  Competing wheat supplies, barring adverse weather, are much more 
readily available from other countries than for corn and soybeans.  At this writing, it appears likely 
that a number of important wheat exporting countries will continue to produce non-GMO wheat for 
the next few years.  Moreover, wheat exports are a much higher percentage of total demand for 
spring wheat than for U.S. corn (about 40% vs. 18%), thus creating greater downward price risk.  As 
this report was being written, total U.S. wheat exports were already at a very depressed level, the 
lowest since 1971-72 in the 2002-03 marketing year just ended. In the 2003-04 marketing year, a 
temporary increase is expected due to unusually severe weather problems in Europe and the 
former Soviet Union.  Another contrast between wheat and corn is that domestic processor 
demand for corn has been a strong growth market due to rising demand for corn-based fuel 
ethanol, while domestic demand for spring wheat has grown only slowly in recent years.  Thus, 
domestic demand for wheat cannot be counted on to profitably absorb losses in export markets in 
the same way as with corn.  
 
At least 37 countries currently have mandatory labeling programs for food that contains detectable 
GMO ingredients above prescribed levels.  Another 10 to 12 countries very likely will initiate 
mandatory GMO labeling programs in the next few years.  The recent ratification of the Cartagena 
Protocol on Global Biosafety (which became operational on September 11, 2003) and prospects for 
commercialization of a large number of new GMO crops and livestock in the next few years may 
encourage increased labeling by foreign countries.  The up-coming enlargement of the European 
Union (EU) with at least 10 potential new entrants also will encourage more labeling. 
 
Durum wheat exports would be at risk if GMO HRS wheat is adopted.  Durum wheat is grown on 
farms that produce HRS wheat, and is marketed through the same marketing system as HRS wheat.  
About two-thirds of U.S. durum wheat exports recently have gone to the EU, where the current 
threshold for GMO labeling is 1.0% and is expected to decline to 0.9% starting in 2004, for 
approved GMO crops. In EU, most U.S. durum exports go to Italy, and EU Prospects for 
government approval of GMO wheat remain uncertain.  Even if approved by the EU government, 
the EU labeling system will allow consumers to determine the demand for such wheat.  North Africa 
is another major market for Durum wheat, and several countries there appear likely to reject GMO 
wheat.  These two regions accounted for nearly 90% of U.S. durum wheat exports in 2001-02. 
 
The EU has had a five-year moratorium on approval of new GMO crops.  Unless approved by the 
EU government, lack of approval of GMO spring wheat would further reduce the EU labeling 
threshold for GMO spring wheat and durum wheat in consumer products from its current 1%.  And 
with or without EU government approval, a number of foreign buyers might well reduce tolerances 
for GMO wheat to zero.  For example, the CEO of largest wheat milling firm in Italy has indicated 
strongly that his firm sees no reason to risk customer rejection of its products by buying wheat from 
areas that produce GMO wheat.  The U.K.’s largest milling company also has indicated that it will 
not buy GMO wheat as long as current consumer attitudes toward the product continue.  Other 
market indicators show strong negative responses in the Far East. 
  
The Issue is Consumer Acceptance, not Food Safety 
 
Much foreign consumer concern centers on questions of food safety and the adequacy of U.S. and 
foreign government regulatory processes.  These concerns may or may not be scientifically valid.   
However, the key issue from a marketing standpoint is not whether the product is safe.  It is “Will 
the final consumer accept GMO wheat?”  Right or wrong, consumers are the driving force in 
countries where market mechanisms allow choice through food labeling.  Also note that in 
countries where food labeling is mandatory, governmental approval of the product does not 
guarantee consumer acceptance.  Attitudes toward GMO wheat may change over time, but it is 
difficult to predict how soon that may occur.  Attitude change could be accelerated by a concerted 
effort to listen to and address consumer concerns, and by the development of GMO products with 
clear health benefits to consumers. 
 
 
Dual Marketing Systems for GMO & Non-GMO Wheat 
 
Some analysts indicate that a simple and straightforward solution to the consumer acceptance 
problem is to create a dual marketing system that provides U.S. GMO wheat to buyers who will 
accept it, and non-GMO wheat to others who don’t want it.  So far, after four years of large 
commercial GMO corn, canola and soybean production, such a system is being used only to a 
limited extent for non-GMO crops in those industries and has not been adequate to prevent loss of 
the EU corn, canola, and soybean meal markets.  Surveys of firms using a dual marketing system 
indicate there are substantial costs and major challenges in avoiding accidental co-mingling
1 of 
GMO and non-GMO products from the seed industry all the way to the final overseas user.  In cases 
where such a system has been used, its costs have been well above those of the existing rapid-
receiving, large volume, rapid unloading, handling, and transport system that dominates the current 
global grain exporting industry.  Costs for a dual marketing system are likely to be lower in areas 
dominated by barge shipments of grain to major ports than in areas such as the Northern Plains 
where rail shipments are the dominant transportation method.  
 
Several estimates of the cost of a dual marketing system are available.  The lowest estimated costs 
are less than four cents per bushel, while estimates from a U.S. Department of Agriculture survey 
would put costs into the $0.70 per bushel or higher range when all domestic and overseas marketing 
and testing costs plus a premium to farmers for crop segregation are included.  Costs from a 
University of Illinois survey of elevators segregating specialty crops, excluding costs further up the 
marketing system, are between these two extremes.  Industry efforts to collect and segregate 
StarLink® corn from normal marketing channels indicate a price premium to producers is necessary 
to cause segregation.  When additional costs further up the system are included, the Illinois survey 
would put costs close to USDA numbers.  
 
                                                 
1 The term, adventitious (added extrinsically, occurring sporadically) is often used to describe presence of unwanted 
GMO products in non-GMO supplies.  In this report, the terms “co-mingled” and “contaminated” are used 
interchangeably to denote the presence of unwanted GMO supplies in non-GMO grain.   When the latter term is used, it 
is intended to denote the concept of reducing the market value of the product in which it is found, with no inferences 
regarding food safety. 
 With a dual marketing system where added costs are passed on to final users of the crop, foreign 
buyers would ask themselves “Why should I pay this premium for U.S. non-GMO wheat if I can 
get similar non-GMO wheat supplies from another country that does not produce GMO wheat, 
without having to pay the segregation costs?”  Or “Can I pay a fraction of these segregation costs 
to producers in another country, for example a former Soviet republic, and encourage them to 
produce more of the wheat my customers want, without paying the full U.S. segregation cost?”  
Also, foreign food processor and retailer concerns about maintaining the integrity of their products 
and consumer acceptance would require a high level of assurance that a U.S. dual marketing system 
would provide a very low risk of GMO contamination.  Judging from experiences with corn and 
soybeans, that assurance is likely to involve substantial cost. 
 
Important costs that must be considered in a dual marketing system include not only the costs of 
testing but also: 
•  Investment costs needed for extra dump pits, elevator conveyor, storage, and load-out 
facilities to avoid accidental contamination and bottlenecks in receiving grain. 
•  Extra waiting-time costs for farmers, truckers, and elevators at harvest time. 
•  Extra hauling costs and harvesting delay costs for farmers who are required to transport 
grain to distant locations that specialize in marketing non-GMO wheat. 
•  Indirect costs such as possible reduced volumes of grain that can be stored for basis gains 
in hedging and reduced ability to take advantage of short-term basis movements due to 
more limited ability to use rapid, large-volume shipments. 
•  Less than full utilization of elevator storage capacity and storage bins, thus spreading 
costs of these facilities over fewer bushels. 
•  Increased use of smaller, inefficient, higher-cost elevators in a dual system. 
•  Loss of major cost advantages that result from large-volume rail shipments. 
•  Costs of finding alternative markets and re-routing grain to acceptable markets when a 
shipment is rejected at a port or other market destination. 
•  Costs of cleaning out an elevator or processing plant, or recalling retail products when 
accidental GMO contamination occurs.  These costs include downtime for facilities and 
transportation equipment, as well as other direct costs. 
•  Premiums paid to wheat growers to cover costs for extra time and management required 
for record-keeping, testing, avoiding contamination in drills, combines, bins, conveyor 
systems, and transportation equipment, and to insure that no volunteer or accidental 
cross-pollination with GMO wheat contaminates non-GMO varieties in seed, 
commercial, or organic production. 
 
The National Grain and Feed Dealers Association recently estimated that less than five percent of 
the U.S. grain elevators have the ability to operate such a dual grain marketing system.  While 
segregation of wheat by protein content and segregation from other grains occurs in the current 
marketing system, indications are that tolerance levels of foreign wheat buyers will be much more 
rigorous on GMO content than for these market variables.  That, in turn, will likely generate much 
higher segregation costs.  The Canadian grain marketing system currently has greater ability to 
segregate grain than the U.S. system, and could have longer-term competitive advantages in 
GMO/non-GMO segregation if it continues as presently structured. 
 
 
 Legal Issues 
 
Other major issues related to introduction of GMO wheat are in the legal area.  Legal issues focus on 
who is responsible for costs or reduced crop values if GMO wheat varieties adversely affect non-
GMO wheat producers, seed growers, or organic producers’ businesses through accidental co-
mingling, cross pollination, growth of volunteer GMO wheat, or contamination that requires closing 
down of processing plants for cleaning and recall of products from retail shelves.  This latter issue 
has occurred in the corn industry, and in the case of StarLink® corn, have led to one of the most 
expensive food industry problems in U.S. history.  Firms and individuals with a potentially 
important stake in legal issues include non-GMO seed and commercial non-GMO wheat producers, 
organic wheat producers and marketers, grain elevators, and other processing and food-marketing 
firms, as well as local governments and businesses whose revenues are dependent on the profitability 
of wheat production.  
 
 
Potential Market Impacts 
 
Important market indicators point to a high risk that up to 30 to 50 percent of the foreign market for 
U.S. HRS wheat and even more of the U.S. durum wheat exports could be lost if HRS GMO wheat 
is introduced into the U.S. in the next two to six years.  Three alternative market scenarios of partial 
export market loss are examined here.  With normal U.S. and foreign average wheat yields, the 
analysis shows a high risk that U.S. average HRS prices would be forced down to feed-wheat price 
levels, approximately one-third lower than the average of recent years.  Durum wheat exports and 
prices also would likely face substantial risk.  An extensive Canadian study of potential effects from 
GMO wheat commercialization also finds the potential for substantial negative impacts on Canada’s 
wheat markets.   
 
Negative export and price impacts identified here would be lessened if (1) foreign consumer 
attitudes toward GMO wheat become positive or (2) ways are found to develop a highly dependable 
dual marketing system that creates a very low risk of GMO wheat co-mingling with non-GMO 
supplies, at an economically insignificant cost.  Changes in consumer attitudes might well occur with 
(1) a concerted and serious attempt to listen to and address consumer concerns and/or (2) 
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The consumer may be right or wrong, informed or misguided, flippant 
or serious-minded. Nonetheless, it is consumer choice that drives the 
entire food system.  If significant numbers of consumers register their 
preferences on a food feature or trait, and that preference is negative 
(or positive), the results are quickly transmitted through the food chain 
to the producer.  
– Neil E. Harl, Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor of 
Agriculture and Professor of Economics, Iowa State University (2002) 
 
 
By Dr. Robert Wisner 
University Professor of Economics 
Iowa State University 
 
As this study is being conducted, a major seed firm has applied for de-regulation and 
commercial sale of herbicide-resistant GMO (genetically modified organism) hard red spring 
(HRS) wheat in the U.S.  Although the exact timing of its availability is uncertain, this type 
of wheat is expected to be commercially available to U.S. farmers sometime in the next one 
to four years.  The issues surrounding GMO foods are highly controversial in international 
markets.  Many agriculturalists in U.S. and South America, as well as officials concerned 
about the future adequacy of world food supplies, see great potential for this technology.  
Concepts being explored at the think-tank stage include creation of plants that are resistant to 
drought, salt water, insects, diseases, other pests, and herbicides, or that can supply their own 
nitrogen needs.  Other dimensions of GMO work include research to develop plants with 
improved milling, health and nutritional qualities, and plants with pharmaceutical properties. 
 
At the other side of the GMO picture, there are strong negative attitudes toward GMO crops 
and GMO foods in many foreign markets for U.S. wheat.  The focus of foreign consumers is 
on food and environmental safety issues, the extreme difficulty of reversing GMO 
technology once it becomes widespread, and potential monopolization of the global 
seed/food industry. (For monopoly concerns, see Harl, 2003).  If the rest of the world 
accepted GMO food products as readily as U.S. consumers do, one could build a strong case 
for significant economic advantages to U.S. agriculture from widespread commercialization 
of this type of wheat.  However, the economic picture is greatly complicated by foreign 
consumer concerns about GMO foods.  In an export-dependent commodity like wheat, it is 
essential that an export market assessment be included in any GMO economic feasibility 
study.  
                                                 
∗ Views expressed here are those of the author and not necessarily those of Iowa State University.  Work 
reported here is from a research contract with the Western Organization of Resource Councils on potential 
short-run impacts of the introduction of Round-Up Ready
® hard red spring wheat on exports and prices of that 
class of wheat. 
 
1  
The purposes of this project are to examine (1) potential short-run impacts on hard red spring 
and durum wheat export markets and prices from the U.S. commercialization of Roundup-
Ready®  (GMO) spring wheat, and (2) to touch on issues of the organic wheat industry that 
are related to the introduction of GMO spring wheat.  Official standards as well as consumer 
demand require organic wheat to be non-GMO varieties. 
 
 
The Industry Setting 
 
Wheat exports are vital to U.S. producers of spring wheat and other classes of wheat because 
domestic demand is much smaller than potential U.S. production. In 2001-02, the domestic 
market for hard red spring wheat absorbed only 61% of total U.S. production. U.S. wheat 
exports have been in a long-term downward trend for many years, with exports in the 2002-
03 marketing year dropping to the lowest level since 1971-72.  Loss of wheat export markets 
has been accompanied by:  
•  a downward trend in wheat prices. 
•  loss of wheat acreage. 
•  loss of revenue to industries supplying inputs to wheat producers. 
•  loss of revenue from sale of wheat production that affects not only farmers but 
other rural farm-related and non-farm businesses, local and state government tax 
revenues, and institutions supported by tax revenues. 
•  diminished economic health of rural communities and state governments in the 
spring wheat belt. 
 
Impacted non-farm businesses include auto dealers, furniture, appliance, hardware, clothing, 
health-care, construction and other sectors.  Farm incomes have a multiplier affect on local 
economies as they move through these businesses.  With this background, it is clear that 
economic concerns related to the introduction of GMO wheat affect a much broader segment 
of the Northern Plains economy than just the farm production sector. 
 
For a number of reasons, consumers in many foreign countries have attitudes toward GMO 
crops that range from substantial concern to extremely strong negative reactions.  Indicators 
of consumer feelings toward GMO crops include the fact that at least thirty-seven 
countries currently label foods containing GMO ingredients (Phillips and McNeill, and 
Reuter press releases 2001, 2002, and 2003).  Labeling food that contains GMO ingredients 
does not prevent U.S. sales in those countries.  However, the labeling programs have been 
implemented because of consumer demand for them. 
 
Labeling provides a mechanism that consumers can use to reflect the type and intensity of 
their preferences about GMOs in the market place.  In the U.S., no such mechanism is 
present.  In most international markets, many of the products of the two main GMO food-
related crops, corn and soybeans, so far have avoided labeling.  Two other types of U.S.-
produced GMO food crops, insect-resistant potatoes and longer-shelf-life tomatoes, were 
introduced commercially, but have been economic failures because of widespread rejection 
by the food industry. GMO Flax was developed in the early 1990s but was not 
2 commercialized because of concern about potential lost export markets (Dawson, A., 
February 27, 2003).  A type of GMO sugar beet has been developed, but reportedly is not 
being used commercially.  Sugar companies determine what varieties farmers plant, and have 
chosen not to offer GMO sugar to consumers.  In Canada, GMO canola is a major crop that is 
used to produce vegetable oil and protein meal for livestock.  Consumers in the EU, formerly 
an important market for this crop, have rejected it (AGRIWEEK, July 11, 2003), although 
Canada continues to export to other countries. 
 
The other major commercial GMO crop, cotton, is not a food crop.  It is, however, a source 
of vegetable oil that competes with corn and soybean oil, and protein meal that competes in 
livestock feed markets.  GMO protein is removed from the cottonseed oil as well as corn and 
soybean oil and many other consumer products made from corn and soybeans, either through 
processing or through livestock feeding.  Hence, these products have not required GMO 
labeling.  This will not be the case for high-quality spring wheat and wheat products, 
where the protein is expected to remain in almost all consumer products.   
 
In the next few years, the number of countries labeling GMO foods is almost certain to 
expand to at least 46 to 48 countries.  A major market for U.S. wheat, the European Union 
(EU), took action in November 2002 to tighten its GMO standards further, by lowering to 
0.9% the GMO content threshold at which GMO labeling is required, and by extending 
labeling to processed food products for which processing has removed the GMO protein 
(just-food.com, 11/29/02; J. Smith, Reuters, 28 Nov 2002).  Its Parliament passed legislation 
in early July 2003 setting the stage for these and other changes in its labeling laws to become 
operational in 2004 (European Union, July 1 and July 2, 2003, New York Times, July 3, 
2003).  A few more steps are needed to finalize the implementation of these changes. 
 
The new EU legislation calls for development of processes for mandatory labeling of GMO 
feed ingredients and a system for tracing the source of feed ingredients, similar to one 
already used for livestock products (ibid).  Traceability of GMO ingredients is provided for 
in the U.N. Codex Alimentarius Commission documents (FAO, United Nations, July 9, 
2003).  The new EU legislation also provides for labeling of previously unlabeled products 
such as vegetable oils, sweeteners, and livestock feeds. 
 
The EU in late 2002 formalized the processes by which 10 Central and East European 
nations are expected to be admitted to the EU in next few years.  These nations will be 
required to adopt EU policies related to GMO crop production and foods.  Accordingly, the 
prospective entrants into EU in most cases already are limiting or prohibiting commercial 
production of GMO crops.  At some future time when admitted to the EU, they will become 
both markets for and production sources for non-GMO crops.  Several East European 
nations are net grain exporters and have the potential to increase exports in the future. 
 
EU actions, as well as a major consumer survey, indicate the EU’s consumer resistance 
to GMO crops has increased in recent years.  In the 1990s, several EU individual country 
governments initially responded favorably to the commercialization of GMO crops and 
approved imports of several GMO corn and soybean events.  But as consumer concerns 
increased, the EU has had a de-facto five-year moratorium on approval of any new GMO 
3 crops.  At this writing, it seems probable that EU consumer resistance will be strong enough 
to prevent marketing of products from GMO wheat in the EU the short run.  Even if GMO 
wheat receives EU government approval, it is highly doubtful that consumers and the food 
industry will be willing to buy it during the next two to six years.  An example of deeply 
entrenched attitudes is shown by the following excerpt from the Cabinet Office, British 
Government, Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, Scoping Note, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
GM CROPS.  This is a response from the National Federation of Women’s Institutes (U.K.), 
October 2002: 
 
“In the wake of BSE , FMD, and MMR, the British public is very 
unwilling to accept government assurances that something is ‘safe’.  
The perceived problems with GM, coupled with the complete lack of 
any benefits to the consumer of the current GM Maize and Soya crops, 
will make the introduction of future GMOs very difficult to market.” 
 
Other examples: 
•  The prestigious British Medical Association recently indicated, "There has not yet been 
a robust and thorough search into the potentially harmful effects of GM foodstuffs 
on human health.  On the basis of the precautionary principle
2, farm-scale [GMO] trials 
should not be allowed to continue." (Scottish Parliament’s “Health and Community Care 
Committee, 1st Report 2003”, bold added for emphasis). 
•  A Community-wide 2001 survey of EU consumers by the EU Eurobarometer, for the 
National Consumer Council, indicated 94% of European consumers want the right to 
choose whether to eat GMO food, and 70.9% do not want to eat this type of food at all.  
(RGSB Omnibus Survey for NCC). 
•  In the same survey, 79% of consumers indicated they believe meat and other animal 
products produced with GMO feed should be labeled (op. cit., p. 91). 
•  Another Eurobarometer survey indicated that between 1996 and 1999, attitudes of 
EU citizens toward GMO food became more negative (INRA (Europe)-ECOSA).  In 
1996, 54% of respondents indicated the use of modern biotechnology offered some 
useful applications in the production of food.  By 1999, only 43% of the respondents 
answered the same question positively.  The survey indicated that the most trusted 
sources of information on GMO food are consumer organizations and the Medical 
profession (op. cit., p. 91).  
 
On the other side of the globe, there also is evidence of strong negative consumer attitudes 
toward GMO food grains.  Japan announced in July of 2002 that, beginning in April of 2003, 
it will require mandatory testing of feed ingredients for unapproved GMO content, in 
addition to its food-labeling program that has been in effect for two years (Japan Agrinfo 
Newsletter). 
                                                 
2 The pre-cautionary principle is provided for in the United Nations, Food and Agricultural 
Organization, Cartagena Protocol on Biosaftety, “Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
About the Protocol”, http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/background.asp
 
4  
A report from Japan indicates that on December 5, 2002, The Aichi Prefecture, Japan, 
Department of Agriculture and Forestry announced it will cease its cooperative research with 
Monsanto in the development of Roundup® herbicide tolerant rice that had been underway 
since 1996 (Kawata, Masaharu).  This report indicated the Aichi Department of Agriculture 
and Forestry also announced it had decided not to commercialize the herbicide-tolerant rice 
strain because many Japanese consumers are opposed to it.  The decision reportedly came in 
response to a “NO GMO” campaign involving 148 organizations, including consumer 
groups and organic farmers.  Leaders of the campaign presented a petition with more than 
580,000 signatures opposing the development and commercialization of the GM rice to the 
Governor of Aichi Prefecture (ibid.).  Taiwan and Sri Lanka have just initiated GMO food 
labeling programs in response to consumer concerns. 
 
The Cartagena Global Biosafety Protocol Agreement, to be implemented by the United 
Nations, was negotiated in February 2001 by a meeting of 120 nations.  It allows countries to 
label food containing GMOs (Cartagena Protocal on Biosafety, op. cit.).  Ratification by 50 
countries is required for the Agreement to be implemented.  By June 10, 2003, 50 
nations had ratified the agreement, setting the stage for it to be implemented beginning 
September 11, 2003.  The Agreement was developed to provide an organized global 
mechanism for dealing with the hundreds of new GMO varieties of crops and livestock that 
are anticipated to be presented for commercialization in the next few years.  One hundred 
three countries signed the Protocol, indicating they have general support for the agreement 
and intend to become parties to it. (Ibid.) 
 
 
USDA Federal Grain Inspection Service non-GMO Wheat Certification  
 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture, Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards 
Administration (GIPSA) administer inspection of U.S. wheat as it is loaded on ships for 
export.  One indicator of foreign buyer concern about GMO wheat is widespread foreign-
buyer requests that U.S. certify its wheat as being GMO free.  Since September1999, at the 
request of foreign wheat customers and wheat exporting firms, GIPSA has been issuing 
certification statements indicating that “There are no transgenic wheat varieties for sale or 
in commercial production in the United States.”  GIPSA indicates countries representing 
very large U.S. wheat export markets request this statement, including Japan, Mexico, South 
Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Italy.  These markets alone accounted for 54 percent of 
all U.S. hard red spring wheat exports in 2002-03 and 60 percent of U.S. durum wheat 
exports in 2001-02.  GIPSA estimates that countries representing about half of all U.S. wheat 
exports (including the other four classes of wheat) request this statement. (USDA, GIPSA, 
March 20,2003).  If there is an interim period during which Round-Up Ready
® wheat is de-
regulated but not yet offered for commercial production, GIPSA indicates this statement will 
no longer be possible unless Monsanto meets three specific conditions each year.  Those 
conditions include (USDA, GIPSA, March 20, 2003, op. cit.):  
•  a signed statement from Monsanto at the beginning of the marketing year and 
updated during the year if necessary indicating that RR.W is not for sale or in 
commercial production in the U.S. 
5 •  an approved and audited ISO 9001-2001 quality management system to assure 
that RR.W seed production does not enter commercial channels. 




GMO Challenges Experienced by the U.S. Corn, Soybean, and Food Industries 
 
The U.S. has lost the formerly important EU market for corn because of GMO acceptance 
problems.  In years before 1996, EU corn exports typically were valued at $200 million or 
more annually.  At this writing, the U.S. also has lost most of the formerly important EU 
soybean meal market.  U.S. soybean meal exports to the EU last year recorded a 52% year-
to-year decline, and cumulative U.S. soybean meal exports and outstanding unshipped sales 
to EU for the 2002-03 marketing year through June 26, 2003were 77% below the low level 
of a year earlier.  U.S. sales to the EU so far this marketing year are equivalent to the meal 
from only 2.8 million bushels of soybeans, and are equivalent to only 2/10% of the EU’s 
estimated annual soybean meal imports.  The EU typically has been a large market for U.S. 
soybean meal, often the largest or second largest U.S. export market for that commodity.  It 
is by far the world’s largest import market for soybean meal, accounting for about half of 
global soybean meal trade (USDA, FAS, 12/10/2002 and 1/30/2003).  Brazil has become a 
major supplier of soybean meal to EU because of its non-GMO soybean production in newly 
developing agricultural areas in its Center West.  
 
The U.S. has lost nearly all of the South Korean corn market, which only four years ago was 
the second largest export market for U.S. corn (ibid.).  The South Korean market is now 
being supplied by non-GMO Chinese corn, as are several other Asian markets.  In addition, 
several African countries in late summer of 2002 rejected U.S. food aid shipments of GMO 
corn even though the net price was extremely low.  In early January 2003, India rejected a 
shipment of food aid U.S. corn and soybeans because it was believed to contain GMO grain. 
 
In other GMO-related developments, the U.S. has had serious and expensive problems 
related to contamination of commercial corn with corn varieties not approved in all markets.  
More recently, such problems have occurred with pharmaceutical corn, although the 
problems were detected in time to avoid serious contamination in the food sector.  StarLink® 
corn was a major problem in 2001, and re-emerged as a problem in U.S. corn shipments to 
Japan in late December of 2002, even though less than one percent of the nation’s corn 
acreage was planted to StarLink® varieties in 2000 and sale of the seed was banned for 2001 
and later years.  In Canada, canola farmers have lost the formerly important EU export 
market because of consumer rejection of GMO canola (Calgary Herald). 
 
It is in this setting of major foreign consumer concern about GMO grain and oilseeds that this 
study examines potential short-term (two to six year) impacts on durum and hard red spring 
wheat exports and prices from the introduction of commercial hard red spring wheat 
production in the U.S. 
 
 
6 The Organic Food Sector, GMO Wheat, and Legal Issues 
 
The organic food industry has been the most rapidly growing component of the U.S. food 
sector and also is experiencing rapid demand growth in foreign markets.  While the organic 
food market is much smaller than the rest of the food industry, its size is economically 
significant.  Western Canadian organic farmers reportedly can no longer grow organic canola 
because of cross-pollination with GMO canola (Belcher et. al., 2002).  Concern about cross-
pollination of GMO wheat with organic wheat, potential accidental co-mingling of seed 
supplies, and consumer confidence are critical issues for organic food producers in the Spring 
Wheat Belt. The impact of introducing GMO wheat is a major concern to organic wheat 
producers.  There fear is that potential GMO contamination will diminish or eliminate their 
ability to generate additional income through price premiums paid for organic wheat 
production.  
 
Data on price premiums paid for organic production is sketchy, especially for grains.  Some 
reports indicate they may in many cases be at least 50 percent higher than U.S. cash and 
futures prices for conventionally-grown spring wheat.  The increases in acreage indicate that 
the premiums and the added income are enough to entice some farmers to switch to organic 
wheat production.  However, organic farmers are concerned over the possible cross 
contamination with the introduction of GMO wheat that could eliminate their markets 
(Brasher, July 14, 2003). 
 
Although they are not addressed here, a host of legal liability questions related to seed 
supplies, production, marketing, transportation, processing and retailing also come to the 
forefront with the introduction of GMO wheat.  These legal issues are extremely important to 
producers and consumers of organic, conventional and GMO crops as well as the seed, grain, 
and processing industries.  Legal issues center around the question of who is liable if 
unwanted GMO supplies are found in seed, grain to be marketed, grain elevators, the 
transportation system, processing plants or in finished products on retailer shelves, and 
cause reduced economic value of products in which they are found.  Legal issues affect the 
ability of both U.S. non-GMO and organic producers to service domestic and foreign 
customers.  Solutions to the legal issues, while extremely important, are beyond the scope 
of this report.  
 
 
Role of the Final Consumer in Determining Product Choice 
 
When considering the introduction of GMO wheat, a guiding principle should be that the 
actual market is the consumer, rather than the grower who will produce it and hope the 
market will accept it several months after the seed has been purchased and planted.  In 
virtually all non-agricultural markets, the main focus of product innovation is the needs 
and desires of the final consumer.  Industrial history is full of examples where products 
failed because they did not meet the desires of the final consumer or were offered in the 
market before consumers were ready to accept them.  This same principle applies to 
agriculture.  The consumer is King (Harl, 2002).  Negative consumer attitudes toward GMOs 
in international markets may continue at least until GMO crops with clear consumer benefits 






GMO is an inaccurate term commonly used to describe transgenic or biotech crops.  Plants 
have been genetically modified for centuries through traditional plant breeding.  However, 
advancements in biotechnology now permit genes from totally unrelated species to be 
inserted into a plant or animal to provide new characteristics that otherwise would either 
take many years to develop or would be impossible to develop through conventional 
breeding.  Crops or other products produced through these processes are being referred to as 
Genetically Modified Organisms or GMOs. 
 
In the case of currently available insect-resistant corn, a fungus gene is inserted into the plant 
to make it resistant to corn borers and/or rootworms.  In the development of Round-Up
® 
herbicide-resistant crops, a gene from herbicide-resistant bacteria found at a herbicide factory 
has been inserted into the plant (Charles, p. 69).  Stacked GMO corn events may contain both 
types of genes.  Thus, in contrast to traditional plant breeding, GMO crop varieties are 
created by inserting genes from totally unrelated organisms into plants that, in a non-biotech 
environment, would never cross breed.  The process of developing GMO crops also typically 
includes the use of an antibiotic-resistant marker gene and a promoter gene.  Cauliflower 
mosaic virus is a common source of the promoter gene (ibid). 
 
U.S. industry voluntary testing procedures have not found food safety problems from this 
process and its resulting products.  The U.S. Food and Drug Administration, which is 
responsible for food safety, considers currently available commercial GMO crops to be 
“substantially equivalent”
3 to those developed through conventional plant breeding, and thus 
not requiring extra testing or labeling for food safety (Belson, op. cit.).  Crops are given the 
“substantially equivalent” designation after companies developing them have run tests of 
nutritional composition, and tests for known allergens and toxins that show no significant 
differences from conventional varieties.  However, the types of genes being inserted into 
GMO crops have caused concern in Europe and other areas, and have generated requests for 
more rigorous research on long-term safety of GMO foods. 
 
As stated earlier, it is not the purpose of this report to address the question of whether these 
concerns are valid or whether more food safety research is needed.  Rather, it is to increase 
the understanding of why foreign consumers have concerns about the safety of GMO crops, 
and the market implications of those concerns.  Consumer concerns and perceptions are 
driving forces in market demand. 
 
GMO technology may not be the only way of obtaining some of the benefits of this new crop 
production technology.  New ways of analyzing plant genetic information suggest that at 
                                                 
3 The “Substantially Equivalent” concept originated with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in 1993 (United Nations, FAO web site) 
8 least some of the potential gains being obtained from GMO crops can also be obtained by 
working with the plant’s own genetic structure without inserting foreign genes (Zhu, 1999). 
 
 
Rapid Adoption of GMO Soybeans 
 
U.S. soybean growers have adopted GMO technology more rapidly than almost any other 
new technology in the history of American agriculture.  The first GMO soybean seed became 
widely available to producers in 1997.  By 2002, about three-fourths of the U.S. soybean 
acreage was estimated to be planted to GMO varieties (USDA, NASS).  Cotton farmers also 
have been quick to adopt GMO varieties in their fight against harmful insects and weeds, 
with 71% of the 2002 U.S. cotton acreage planted to GMO varieties (op. cit.). 
 
While GMO technology is being used in corn production, its adoption by corn growers has 
been much slower than for soybeans and cotton.  About one-third of the nation’s corn 
acreage was planted to GMO varieties in 2002 (op. cit.).  Percentages of corn, cotton, and 
soybean crops that are GMO varieties vary considerably from state to state.  For corn in 
2002, this percentage ranged from an estimated low of nine percent in Ohio to a high of 66 
percent in South Dakota.  Midwest corn and soybean states west of the Mississippi river 
generally grow higher percentages of GMO crops than states further east, in part because of 
greater insect problems and a greater need to reduce the risk of soil moisture depletion that 
comes from tillage operations.  Round-Up
® herbicide is commonly used in no-till and limited 
tillage farming because it kills most weeds. 
 
 
Input vs. Output Trait GMO Crops 
 
Current GMO crops can be described as “input trait” technology.  The traits inserted into 
seed through artificial genetic manipulation substitute for other inputs or practices that 
normally would be used to control insects or weeds.  “Output trait” GMO crops would have 
readily perceivable benefits for consumers and might cause consumers to have more 
favorable attitudes toward GMO food crops.  Although work is underway to develop “output 
trait” GMO crops, the research has not yet led to commercially available crops with clear 
benefits to consumers.  At this writing, commercial production of “output trait” GMO crops 
appears likely to be available several years from now. 
 
One such product that received widespread positive publicity in the early 1990s was the 
“Flavr Savr” tomato, produced by the Calgene Company.  It had an increased shelf life that 
was designed to permit harvesting when the crop was fully ripe.  Its main advantage was the 
potential to provide consumers with a more colorful and flavorful tomato than is available 
from conventional varieties.  However, the “Flavr Savr’s” handling characteristics proved 
inadequate for normal marketing channels, and this tomato is no longer commercially 
available (Charles, p. 145).   
 
Another widely publicized type of “output trait” GMO crop is “golden rice”.  It contains 
more vitamin A than traditional varieties and is being designed to reduce malnutrition and 
9 blindness in developing nations.  “Golden rice” is still in the development phase and may not 
be available to rice producers for several years.  A number of other types of “output trait” 
crops are being considered that may provide improved nutrition, vaccines, medication or 
other potential benefits to some consumers.  
 
Several test plots of pharmaceutical GMO corn have been grown in the Midwest, adding to 
the complexity of the GMO food safety issue from a consumer and food industry perspective.  
At least two problem situations with these crops led to government seizure of 
pharmaceutical-related crops in 2002 (Fox).  One case involved the growth of volunteer 
pharmaceutical corn in a soybean field that previously raised the corn.  The corn reportedly 
was designed to produce a vaccine to prevent diarrhea in pigs (Rachel’s Environment and 
Health News, 1/30/03).  This problem was discovered after the soybeans were harvested and 
transferred to a grain elevator, where they were co-mingled with other soybeans.   
 
Such events further weaken foreign consumer confidence in government GMO regulations 
and the ability of the grain and food industry to prevent co-mingling of GMO and non-GMO 
grain.  Initial response from the U.S. food industry was a statement indicating that food crops 
should not be used for production of pharmaceuticals and that the integrity of the food 
system and food safety must be of highest priority (Fabi, 02/07/03).  This, in turn, brought 
concerns from farmers and farm-state legislators that their states and regions might be 




Macro Economic Effects: Do Farmers Gain Economically from GMOs? 
 
Research indicates the current insect-resistant GMO technology has a yield-increasing impact 
on corn, especially in years and regions where insects are a serious problem (Duffy).  
Increased crop yields nationally have a negative affect on prices, provided other market 
factors remain constant.  For soybeans, evidence indicates the current GMO technology may 
have a slight yield-depressing impact (Duffy, 2001).  However, the attractiveness of 
herbicide-resistant GMO soybeans comes from the fact that they offer greatly simplified 
weed control.  For soybean growers, weed management traditionally has been a much greater 
problem than for other major crops.  Simplified weed control allows individual farmers to 
farm larger acreages, using a one-pass weed control system (Wisner, et. al.)  The technology 
also facilitates no-till cropping on land that previously was unsuitable for soybean production 
because of limited rainfall and inadequate soil moisture supplies, both in the U.S. and in 
Argentina.  No-till farming conserves soil moisture that would otherwise be lost through 
tillage operations.  This new technology has been a significant factor helping to explain why 
Argentina’s estimated 2003 harvested soybean acreage is 53% above the 1997-2001 average 
(data are from USDA, FAS).  Increased global acreage of soybeans has a negative effect on 
prices, thus tending to reduce farmers’ income from producing the crop.  The Farm Security 
and Rural Investment Act of 2002 provides U.S. soybean growers with two types of price-
sensitive government payments that tend to partially offset negative price impacts from GMO 
soybeans.  These mechanisms are (1) Loan Deficiency Payments and (2) Counter-cyclical 
Payments. When marketing year average prices decline below legislatively-determined 
10 thresholds, payments to U.S. farmers increase to partially or completely offset lower prices 
(Wisner, September 2002).  In Argentina and other soybean producing countries, lack of 
offsetting government payments causes reduced incomes to growers when prices decline.  
U.S. marketing year soybean prices averaged $6.12/ bushel for the nine-year period ending 
with the 1997 marketing year.  With expanded South American and U.S. production, the 
average price for the 1998 through 2002 marketing years was $4.80 per bushel, a decline of 
22 percent. 
 
Except for these offsetting payments, net long-run economic benefits for crop producers 
from adopting GMO technology likely will be zero (Moschini, G.).  However, early-adopters 
may gain through cost savings and/or increased production before the aggregate impacts 
depress prices, depending on prices paid for the seed and the speed with which the 
technology is adopted. 
 
Net short-term impacts on prices depends both on changes in the supply of the commodity 
available to the market and on consumer reaction to the new type of commodity.  Several 
analyses of economic gains from adoption of GMO technology have assumed (1) there will 
be no negative crop price impacts through changes in aggregate supply and (2) consumers 
will readily accept the GMO crops without price discounts.  For the short run (one to six 
years), there is much evidence that this latter assumption is unrealistic for a commodity 
like wheat, whose major market is products for direct human consumption. 
 
For the longer term, the first assumption will almost certainly be violated if the cost-saving 
promises of the biotechnology industry are fulfilled.  Economic analysis indicates market 
impacts from production-increasing or cost-reducing technology will drive prices down to 
the point where the crop producers’ gains from reduced costs and/or increased yields are just 
offset by lower prices.  In this environment, the long-run benefits go to the GMO seed 
company and to consumers through lower priced food—if there are no offsetting negative 
effects for consumers. 
 
 
Foreign Consumer Views 
 
From the viewpoint of many foreign consumers, there is nothing to be gained and may be 
serious disadvantages from purchasing food containing “input trait” GMO ingredients.  For a 
number of reasons (some noted earlier), surveys indicate a large majority of consumers in 
these markets are concerned that GMO crops may have negative long-term health and/or 
environmental effects that have not been adequately researched. 
 
The U.S. government, including foreign embassy offices, and biotech firms have indicated 
that there is no evidence of serious human health problems stemming from consumption of 
U.S.-approved GMO corn and soybeans since the beginning of their extensive commercial 
use in 1999.  However, many foreign consumers would say that science made the same 
conclusion about feeding ruminant-based protein ingredients such as meat meal and tankage 
to ruminants in the years before bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) or Mad Cow 
Disease problems developed.  Consumer groups also call attention to scientific assessments 
11 of the safety of the DDT insecticide and the diethylstilboestrol growth stimulant for cattle as 
they were introduced into the market, for a number of years afterward, and the contrast with  
recent research showing harmful effects (Cohn, B.A., et. al., June 28, 2003).  Science, in the 
early years of these products, indicated they posed no health risks.  Experience with these 
and other products, and serious food safety problems in Europe and the Far East have 
caused foreign consumers to view science as continually evolving.  This view (confirmed 
by history) says there is a potential for current scientific views to change over time with new 
information. 
 
Examples of this viewpoint, while not necessarily reflective of exact foreign consumer views, 
were articulated as follows in a 2000 report from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration on 
focus group studies of consumer attitudes toward GMO foods: 
“In each case, participants saw a technological innovation that was 
introduced mainly for the sake of producers/distributors, with little 
apparent benefit to the consumer.  Such innovations are seen as being 
approved by scientists and regulators, but later found to have 
unanticipated long-term health effects.  It is this hazard model, drawn 
from recent experience with technological innovation that underlies 
participants' views about the wisdom of food biotechnology.   
This hazard model includes roles for various actors such as producers, 
industry, government regulators, scientists and consumers.  It is marked 
by skepticism that the interests of consumers are sufficiently taken into 
account by the other actors.  Some participants complained consumers 
are being used as "guinea pigs" and many were doubtful that 
government regulators and scientists have the ability to counteract the 
powerful profit motives of industry and producers.” (Levy, A. S. and 
Derby, B.M., 2000) 
 
Numerous publications have appeared in Europe, both in the popular press and in technical 
journals, raising questions that relate to internal behavior of cells after receiving genes from 
unrelated species, including bacteria or fungi.  Implications of antibiotic-resistant marker 
genes, use of the cauliflower mosaic virus promoter gene, and various other questions related 
to food safety are concerns (for example, see Charles).  Foreign consumers also express 
concern about a lack of peer-reviewed studies of food safety in the U.S. government approval 
process for GMO crops, and a close relationship between the regulators and regulated firms.  
They point out that the U.S. GMO food safety assessment procedures do not focus on long-
term health affects on humans, and do not require the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to 
test GMO crops for food safety if nutritional, toxicology, and allergenic information indicates 
they are “substantially equivalent” to crops produced through conventional breeding. 
 
Other concerns retarding the acceptance of GMO crops in foreign markets include  
•  The extreme difficulty of reversing the GMO technology once it becomes widely 
adopted in a country—because of cross-pollination, growth of volunteer plants in 
non-GMO fields, and co-mingling of seed supplies. 
•  The concentrated ownership of GMO patents of the five major food and feed 
crops (wheat, rice, corn, canola, and soybeans) in a small number of global firms. 
12 •  Environmental concerns, including impacts on wildlife, native species of the 
plants and closely related plants, soil microbes, and potential for creating insects 
or weeds that are resistant to conventional and GMO control methods. 
 
Economic concentration in the seed industry and a possible monopoly in global seed 
production become a concern because patents for basic seed stock of major food and feed 
crops are being held by a very small and shrinking number of firms (Harl, 2003).  For 
limited-resource farmers in developing countries who do not have money to purchase 
patented GMO seed and typically save part of their crop for seed, there is concern that 
widespread use of GMO varieties and the requirement of annual purchases of new seed 
would lead to a plantation structure of agriculture, displacing many small farms and farm 
families. 
 
One reflection of foreign consumers’ concerns about the adequacy of the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) process for examining the safety of new GMO crops is indicated 
below.  The following note is from a media briefing presentation by Michael Hansen, at 
Brussels, Belgium, January 10, 2003 for Consumers International entitled "Government lack 
of safety standards for GM crops revealed” (Hansen).  Dr. Hansen is a Senior Policy 
Research Associate for the Consumers’ Policy Institute, a division of the Consumers Union, 
the largest consumer organization in the U.S.  His references to GE/GM refer to what is 
commonly referred to as GMO crops in the U.S. 
 
Dr. Hansen reported that, despite indications to the contrary by U.S. Ambassadors in Europe 
and other nations, the U.S. has not used rigorous standards for food safety assessment of GM 
crops and has not formally approved GM corn varieties grown in the U.S.  He indicated that 
for GE/GM plants that produce a pesticide, it is the responsibility of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to approve the safety of the pesticide.  Other dimensions of safety 
of the new GE/GM plant are under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) and the USDA. 
 
In a more detailed statement, in which we have added bold font for emphasis on some items, 
Dr. Hansen said: 
“The fact that FDA does not approve GE/GM crops can be seen in the 
letter FDA sends to the company after completion of a "safety 
consultation."  For example, the letter sent to Monsanto on September 
25, 1996 about its MON810 Bt maize states, ‘Based on the safety and 
nutritional assessment you have conducted, it is our understanding 
that Monsanto has concluded that corn grain and forage derived from 
the new variety are not materially different in composition, safety, or 
other relevant parameters from corn grain and forage currently on the 
market, and that they do not raise issues that would require 
premarket review or approval by FDA” (complete letter is available 
at www.cfsan.fda.gov/~acrobat2/bnfL034.pdf).  Note that FDA does 
not state its own opinion about the safety of this crop; it only states 
what the company believes.  The letters for all 52 ‘safety 
consultations’ done since the Flavr Savr tomato contain basically the 
13 same language.  FDA has recently admitted that it should require 
mandatory notification of GE/GM food marketing, but has not issued 
such a regulation.” (Ibid.) 
 
We note that the above quotation from Dr. Hansen deviates slightly from the FDA letter in 
that it specifies “corn grain and forage”, whereas the FDA letter uses the term, “corn 
products”, which presumably could include forage. 
 
In a prepared statement that may have implications for recent U.S. action to bring EU GMO 
policies to the World Trade Organization, Michael Hansen added: 
“Earlier this year [2002], the Codex Alimentarius Ad Hoc Task Force 
on Foods Derived from Biotechnology reached agreement on a "Draft 
guideline for the conduct of food safety assessment of foods derived 
from recombinant-DNA plants" (ALINORM 03/34, Appendix V, pp. 
61-73).  This document is at Step 8 of the Codex procedure, which 
means that all 35 countries, including the U.S., at the meeting in 
Yokahama, Japan agreed on this document and recommended that it be 
adopted by the full Codex Alimentarius Commission.” (Ibid.). 
 
Details of these recommendations are being finalized in mid-2003 (Ingham, June 
29, 2003, and Agence France Presse English, June 30, 2003)  
 
Hansen noted that if trade disputes over the food safety of GMO crops arise, the World Trade 
Organization would use the standards or guidelines of Codex Alimentarius to settle the 
disputes.  According to Hansen, “At present, the U.S. has not subjected GE/GM maize to 
the complete safety assessment laid out in this document.” (Ibid; bold added for 
emphasis.)  Hansen’s presentation is one of a number of examples illustrating the 
background behind foreign consumers’ mistrust of the U.S. approval system for GMO crops. 
 
The purpose of this report is not to determine whether these and other safety concerns are 
scientifically valid, but to note that they are major influences on foreign consumer 
attitudes toward GMO food and are major potential influences on foreign demand for 
GMO wheat.  Many of these concerns have been sensitized by foreign food safety issues that 
are unrelated to GMO issues, and by GMO problems in the U.S. corn industry—including 
StarLink® and pharmaceutical corn.  These concerns will have direct influence on the 
short-term consumer acceptance of GMO wheat in major export markets and resulting 
price impacts. 
 
U.S. corn industry problems included the co-mingling of small amounts of StarLink® corn 
(initially not approved for human food or export, but later approved for export as feed to 
countries that would accept it) with approved varieties in 2000-01.  Less than one percent of 
the U.S. corn acreage in 2000 was planted to StarLink® corn varieties.  Even so, 
contamination through co-mingling and cross pollination of corn supplies required domestic 
food processing plants to be closed and cleaned out, products to be recalled from retail 
shelves, extra testing of grain and grain products at various points in the U.S. and foreign 
marketing systems, and extra costs in re-routing supplies to alternative markets.  The 
14 StarLink® problem impacted both domestic and foreign markets and was one of the most 
costly problems in the history of the U.S. food industry, despite the small area planted to 
these varieties.  At this writing, legal actions are still pending that relate to assessment of 
costs, determining which players are liable, and reimbursement of injured players. 
 
StarLink® and pharmaceutical corn problems illustrate the challenges in developing identity-
preserved non-GMO crop production and marketing systems, as well as risks which GMO 
production places on neighboring producers of non-GMO crops. 
 
 
Wheat Cross-pollination and Volunteer Wheat Risks 
 
While cross-pollination risks are lower in wheat than in corn, some risk exists.  The risks 
occurs both through cross-pollination along the edges of the fields, with the problem 
increasing year-by-year if the same field is used repeatedly for wheat production, and 
through volunteer wheat that germinates the next year and becomes an increasing problem 
over time, especially if Round-Up
® is the herbicide being used for weed control.  The extent 
of cross-pollination varies with varieties (Eastham and Sweet, February 2002, Van Acker, 
R.C., Brúle-Babel, A.L., and Friesen, L.F., June 2003).  With very low tolerances in foreign 
GMO food labeling programs, these problems are a substantial risk for the U.S. hard red 
spring and durum wheat exports as well as Canadian exports of the same types of wheat. 
 
 
GMO Wheat vs. Corn and Soybeans, from a Consumer Perspective 
 
As we have noted previously, it should be emphasized that the key issue from a demand 
standpoint is not whether consumer safety concerns are scientifically valid.  It is consumer 
perceptions and preferences, not facts that determine market demand.  With the 
background of consumer concerns outlined above, foreign wheat millers and users have been 
uneasy about talk that the U.S. would soon adopt GMO wheat technology.  Many have 
indicated very directly that they will not buy U.S. wheat if producers are permitted to grow 
GMO wheat. 
 
Some proponents of GMO wheat may argue that the market will quickly accept the new type 
of wheat, since U.S. corn and soybeans have continued to find export market outlets despite 
widespread U.S. production of GMO varieties of these crops.  But note that in developed 
countries where corn and soybeans are sold, the large majority of the food products made 
from these crops are processed in ways that remove the GMO protein and avoid labeling.  
Major markets for corn and soybean meal are for livestock and poultry feeds, where the 
products are processed into meat or dairy products.  For corn oil, soybean oil, and corn 
sweeteners, the processing technology removes the GMO protein.  Foreign labeling systems 
so far have not been required to label these food products as containing GMO ingredients or 
made from GMO ingredients.  Also note that several developing nations have rejected U.S. 
food aid shipments of GMO corn, even though the cost was extremely low.  Even with 
widespread foreign acceptance of U.S. corn, total U.S. corn exports to all destinations in the 
15 August-September 2002-03 marketing year are expected to be 34 percent below the 1979-80 
record high and 28 percent below 1995-96 exports. 
 
Unlike corn and soybeans, hard spring wheat and durum wheat are used mostly for direct 
human food consumption.  In typical products made from these types of wheat, such as 
bread, cereals, and pasta, the GMO protein almost certainly would not be processed out, 
and hence the products would be labeled as containing GMO ingredients.  For that reason 
as well as others, it appears likely that negative foreign consumer reaction to GMO wheat 
will be stronger than for corn and soybeans.  Since the U.S. produces about eight percent of 
the world’s wheat, alternative supplies are available elsewhere.  As the wheat industry and 
government officials debate policies related to the adoption of GMO wheat, it is important to 
note that the U.S. share of world wheat exports has been in a downward trend for decades.  
U.S. wheat growers face the challenge of how to make their products as attractive as possible 
to foreign consumers in order to prevent further loss of market share.  Another difference 
between corn and spring wheat is that about 16.5% of the demand for U.S. corn currently 
comes from exports vs. 40% for spring wheat. Also, corn has a rapidly growing domestic 
ethanol market to partially compensate for lost export demand.  Wheat can be used to 




Food Labeling Policies of Foreign Countries 
 
In mid-2003, at least thirty-seven nations had mandatory food labeling programs that 
required food with GMO ingredients exceeding a specified limit to be labeled as containing 
GMO ingredients.  Between ten and 12 other countries are expected to join this group in the 
next few years as the EU accepts new members from Central and Eastern Europe, and as the 
Philippines and other nations implement labeling programs.  Thresholds for GMO labeling 
range from zero, for China, to an expected 0.9 percent (down from the current one percent) 
GMO ingredient content in the EU nations, to five percent in Japan and a number of other 
countries.  Recent actions by individual EU national governments and the EU Parliament are 
expected to add feed ingredients to the labeling program, and to include products for which 
processing has removed the GMO protein.  This latter category includes vegetable oils and 
corn sweeteners (European Union, July 2, 2003, op. cit.).  The trend in many foreign 
nations has been toward more intensive rather than less intensive regulation of GMOs in 
recent years.  The list of countries as of June 2003 that label foods containing GMO 
ingredients above certain threshold levels is shown below.  Taiwan and Malaysia are 




Foreign Markets for U.S. Hard Red Spring Wheat and Durum Wheat 
 
The initial plans for introducing GMO wheat are focused on hard red spring (HRS) varieties, 
grown in the northern Great Plains of the U.S.  This analysis also includes durum wheat, 
since many growers of other spring wheat produce durum wheat, and the two classes of 
16 wheat move in the same marketing channels.  We assume that cross-pollination with HRS 
wheat, growth of volunteer GMO wheat in durum fields, and other accidental co-mingling in 
the production and/or marketing system would place durum wheat at risk in export markets. 
 
There is some question of whether exports of white wheat from the Pacific Northwest and 
hard red winter wheat (HRW) produced in Montana, South Dakota and other northern HRS 
producing states might also be adversely affected by the introduction of GMO HRS wheat. 
Some of this wheat moves in the same marketing channels as HRS wheat.  Also, foreign 
market acceptance problems with HRS wheat would very likely cause this class of wheat to 
be shipped to domestic mills for partial substitution for other classes of wheat, thus bringing 
it into HRW marketing channels outside the Northern Plains.  We discuss possible impacts 
on these classes of wheat later in the report, but have not attempted to estimate possible 
negative effects on domestic wheat milling markets. 
 
Our focus here will be to first consider where U.S. spring wheat exports go and the relative 
size of various foreign markets that label GMO food.  Next, this report will discuss available 
indicators of the degree of risk U.S. exports would be exposed to in the short run if GMO 
wheat is deregulated and produced commercially.  The short run is defined here as two to six 
years.  Figures 1 and 2 show percentage shares of HRS and durum U.S. wheat exports for the 
June-May 2001-02 marketing year by major destinations that are labeling, or likely will be 
labeling or prohibiting GMO wheat imports in the next few years.  Market shares are based 
on USDA data (USDA, FAS, Export Sales, June 6, 2002).  Figure 1 indicates much of the 
U.S. hard red spring wheat export market will face GMO labeling if GMO varieties of this 
class of wheat are widely grown in the northern U.S.  Figure 2 shows the comparable shares 
for U.S. durum wheat exports.   
 
The export market for U.S. durum wheat is heavily dominated by the EU (primarily Italy), 
Algeria and Tunisia.  GMO acceptance has been quite poor in Italy and is highly 
questionable in these two North African countries.  Producers of durum wheat and elevators 
marketing it need to be aware of the EU’s pending 0.9 percent GMO labeling standard.  With 
that standard, the maximum allowable amount of GMO wheat in 10,000 kernels of durum 
wheat would be approximately 90 kernels.  In reality, the effective standard on the U.S. side 
of the marketing system would probably be almost zero. 
 
Because of foreign buyer insistence (as we noted earlier), the USDA Federal Grain 
Inspection Service (FGIS) currently provides export loads of U.S. wheat with a certificate 
stating that the U.S. does not have commercial production of GMO wheat.  Many foreign 
buyers have indicated they will not buy U.S. wheat without this certification.  When U.S. de-
regulation of HRS wheat occurs, these non-GMO certification letters may not be possible 
unless stringent conditions are met. 
 
With the risk of small amounts of HRS GMO wheat contamination of durum supplies 
through volunteer wheat, small amounts in pockets of combines, unloading augers, bottoms 
of farm bins, elevator dump pits, conveyor systems, and by other means, the chances for 
foreign buyer rejection of durum wheat supplies from the northern plains of the U.S. is high. 
Commercialization of GMO HRS wheat may well accelerate durum wheat production in the 
17 southwestern U.S., where fears of contamination with GMO supplies would be much lower 
than in the Northern Plains. 
 
Figure 3 shows total use of U.S. HRS wheat in 2001-02 and the relative amount of total 
demand represented by exports.  Nearly 40 percent of the demand for U.S. HRS wheat 
originates in export markets.  Figure 4 shows the same type of comparison for durum wheat. 
Durum export markets where the probability of GMO labeling or rejection is low in the next 
few years accounted for only about six percent of U.S. durum wheat exports in 2001-02.  
Some individual HRS-producing states export a higher percentage of the crop than the 
national average and could be affected more by loss of export markets than others. 
  Figure 1. Shares of U.S. Hard Red
Spring Wheat Exports by Destination,  
2001-02 
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S. Korea 6% 
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Market Acceptance Indicators 
 
As noted earlier, GMO food labeling would not automatically prevent the U.S. from 
exporting GMO wheat to the various foreign markets.  Labeling serves as a communication 
mechanism between the consumers, retailers, processors, and crop producers.  Market 
impacts could include the following:  
•  Partial or total foreign consumer and/or food processor and retailer rejection of all 
U.S. wheat and wheat products, both GMO and non-GMO. 
•  Foreign consumer acceptance of non-GMO U.S. wheat produced outside the 
Northern Plains but rejection of all HRS wheat and wheat products, as well as 
durum wheat by countries with labeling programs because of substantial co-
mingling risks. 
•  Rejection of HRS and durum wheat and wheat products by a segment of foreign 
consumers, with widespread acceptance by the remaining consumers in labeling 
countries, but with a price discount, and with non-labelers continuing to purchase 
at present levels. 
18 •  Rejection of GMO HRS and durum wheat and wheat products by a fraction of 
foreign consumers in labeling countries who turn to non-U.S. suppliers for their 
wheat needs, with widespread acceptance by the remaining consumers with no 
price discount. 
•  All foreign consumers fully accepting all GMO wheat despite the GMO 
ingredient labels. 
 
The last scenario has a very low probability of occurring in the short run.  At least two of the 
other scenarios likely would involve substantial expense to develop identity preserved 
production and marketing systems, in order to avoid cross-pollination at the farm and seed 
production levels, and co-mingling in the marketing system. 
 
Foreign food retailers and processors will also have a strong potential impact on market 
acceptance.  Retailers or processors who believed the image and reputation of their firms 
would be harmed by marketing GMO food might avoid such ingredients entirely. This has 
happened in the EU, with a number of large retail chains avoiding GMO ingredients in store 
brands in response to consumer concerns about health or environmental safety of the GMO.   
Other evidence about EU acceptance of GMO wheat comes from the CEO of Italy's largest 
wheat miller, Grandi Molini Italiani, who in August 2002 indicated his firm would 
immediately cease buying U.S. wheat if the U.S. allows commercial production of GMO 
wheat varieties.  Its CEO, Antonio Costato, is quoted as saying “We will not only avoid 
buying GM wheat but we will probably be forced to completely avoid importing from those 
countries/regions where it is known that GM wheat is grown…As president of GMI, I do 
not see any reason to expose the company to the risks implied by accidental 
contamination with GM wheat, added Costato, whose company has six Italian mills and 
uses about 1.4 million tons of grain [52 million bushels] annually.” (Reuters News Service, 
2/03/2003; bold added for emphasis).  GMI’s purchases alone are equivalent to 2/3 of the 
2002 Montana HRS wheat production or nearly 1/3 of last year’s North Dakota HRS crop. 
The U.K.’s largest flour miller, Rank Hovis, also indicated it would have to stop purchasing 
North American wheat if GMO wheat is commercialized in the U.S. or Canada and attitudes 
of British consumers continue as at present.  Hovis’s annual purchases of North American 
wheat reportedly have been about 18 million bushels and is used for higher quality bread 
(Harding, 06/03/03).  A Nebraska trade mission to Japan in June 2003 indicated that “Olsen 
(President of Nebraska Farm Bureau) accompanied Gov. Mike Johanns on a Nebraska trade 
mission to Japan last month.  Olsen said Japanese officials didn't mince words about 
genetically modified wheat.  ‘They made it pretty clear they don't want (genetically modified 
crops) for food consumption’, he said.” (Clayton, C., July 14, 2003). 
 
Further evidence of potential serious consumer acceptance problems in the short run comes 
from a survey of Asian buyers by the US Wheat Associates in August 2002 (U.S. Wheat 
Associates, 9/30/02).  U.S Wheat Associates stresses that this survey was not structured to 
give estimates of volumes of exports that might be affected by the introduction of GMO 
wheat.  It did not take into account the volume of purchases represented by individual buyers 
or other details that would be needed to give a precise reading on potential consumer 
demand.  Also, it represents consumer and buyer reactions at a point in time.  Buyer attitudes 
19 may or may not change over 
time as more GMO products 
become available and as more 
research becomes available on 
questions of concern to 
consumers. 
 
The survey of wheat buyers, 
millers and users found that 
"there is currently an 




(Reuters News Service, 
10/10/2002).  The report 
indicated that all Chinese, Korean and Japanese wheat buyer representatives surveyed said 
they would not buy or use Roundup Ready wheat, while 82% of the Taiwanese buyers and 
78% of the South Asian buyers would not buy GMO wheat. 











The Japanese users unanimously 
indicated they would not buy 
GMO wheat, regardless of U.S. 
and Japanese government 
regulations.  Asian wheat buyers 
also said they would not buy 
wheat with even small amounts 
of adventitious presence of 
GMO wheat, according to U.S. 
Wheat Associates official, Dawn 
Forsythe (Ibid.).  U.S. Wheat 
Associates indicated the survey 
represented very large Japanese 
and Korean organizations.  
Taiwanese buyers, while concerned, were less concerned than others about GMO wheat.  
About one-fourth of the Taiwanese buyers indicated they would require GMO-free 
certification of all classes of U.S. wheat if HRS GMO wheat is commercialized (Ibid.).  The 
Canadian Wheat Board indicates more than 80% of its customers have said they will refuse 
to buy genetically modified wheat.  It also indicates that assurances from the Canadian 
government are extremely unlikely to change foreign consumer attitudes toward such wheat 
(Canadian Press, 01/13/03). 
  
 
Assumed Two-to-Six-Year Export Scenarios for Analysis 
 
To estimate potential export and price impacts from commercializing GMO wheat, we used 













RoundUp®-Ready hard red spring wheat, assuming that such wheat is commercialized 
sometime in the next two to six years: 
•  Scenario I: Loss of the entire EU spring wheat and durum wheat export markets 
plus 40% of the other GMO labeling and prospective labeling markets shown in 
Figures 1 and 2 above, with no loss of non-labeling markets. 
•  Scenario II: Loss of the entire EU spring wheat and durum wheat export markets 
plus 25% of the other GMO labeling and prospective labeling markets with no 
loss of non-labeling markets. 
•  Scenario III: The U.S. develops a certified non-GMO marketing system to 
provide guaranteed non-GMO wheat to all GMO-labeling and prospective 
labeling export markets, at an added cost of $0.45 per bushel.  The entire EU 
market is lost, along with 50% of the non-EU labeling and prospective labeling 
markets, and 20% of these non-EU markets utilize the non-GMO certification 
system.  The remaining 30% of the labeling and prospective labeling markets and 
100% of the non-labeling export markets buy GMO wheat at no discount.  Final 
users of the non-GMO wheat pay all of the certification costs, and farmers receive 




Is It Realistic to Assume the EU Wheat Market Will Be Lost? 
 
There is no way of answering this question with 100% certainty.  In assuming the EU market 
would be lost with U.S. commercialization of GMO HRS wheat, we draw on:  
•  The U.S. corn and soybean meal market loss experience. 
•  The Canadian EU canola market loss. 
•  Reactions noted earlier from two large European wheat millers. 
•  Surveys of EU consumers. 
•  Forthcoming modifications in the EU labeling and traceability systems. 
•  EU Food retailer responses to GMO products. 
•  Other evidences of strong negative EU consumer reactions to GMO foods. 
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As further evidence of risk of 
market acceptance of GMO 
products in the EU, note 
Figure 5 which shows recent 
exports of corn to the EU and 
South Korea, and Figure 6 
which shows U.S. soybean 
and soybean meal exports to 
EU. 
 
As this report is being 
written, available indicators 
suggest the risk is very high 
that U.S. adoption of GMO 
wheat in the next two to six 
years would cause loss of 
the entire EU HRS and 
durum wheat markets.  
Segments of other foreign 
markets likely would be lost 
since consumer attitudes 
toward GMOs are negative 
there and alternative wheat 
supplies are readily available 
elsewhere, assuming normal 
weather in major wheat 
growing regions.  Risks in 
the non-EU markets are 
sizeable, although precise 
quantification is not 
possible.  At this writing, the 
U.S. has initiated a protest of the EU GMO regulations through WTO processes, charging 
that EU GMO policies are non-tariff trade barriers.  Judging from previous WTO appeals and 
the complexity of the GMO issue, it may take at least a year or two for a decision to be made.  
Even then, in case of a decision against EU policies, consumer and food industry behavior 
would determine whether the EU would import HRS and durum U.S. wheat. 
 
 
What Does It Cost to Segregate Grain? 
 
Segregation and certification costs are affected by such variables as the amount and type of 
testing required, number of certification-verification points involved, the volume handled, 
loss of efficiency in elevator operations and transportation, cost of added waiting time for 
farmers, premiums paid to provide incentive for producers to apply the additional 
management needed to insure non-co-mingling at the farm and seed production levels, and 
the number of loads failing to meet contract standards at the ports and overseas.  In our 
22 assumed costs for this system, we utilize work from the University of Illinois on recent actual 
costs of segregating non-GMO and other specialty grain and oilseeds at elevators from 
supplies of other grain in conventional marketing channels, plus other costs further upstream 
in the marketing system that are not included in the University of Illinois study. 
 
Costs from the University of Illinois study are as shown in Figure 7.  Note that these costs 
included only those in moving the grain through local elevators.  Additional costs of testing 
and certification would be involved at port elevators and in the foreign marketing system.  
Economies of scale in barge transportation used by some elevators in the survey likely are 
much smaller than for rail transportation used predominantly in the spring wheat areas.  Also 
note that much of the grain handled by these elevators was specialty grains that would have 
less exact contract tolerances than will likely be required by most foreign buyers of non-
GMO wheat. 
Figure 7. University of Illinois Survey of Grain Segregation Costs, 1998 
  
       By K. Bender, L. Hill, B. Wenzel, and R. Hornbaker  
Added Cost, Specialty corn, through Elevators
Handling/Segregation          $ .03/bu.  • 
Risk management                    .01  • 
Transportation                         .01  • 
Analysis/testing                           .01  • 
Purchasing premium                       .18 • 
Total                                      $ .24   ($9.45/m.ton) 
        9% of elevator volume was specialty crops 
 
The additional $0.21 per bushel segregation and certification costs that are assumed in our 
study reflect:  
1)  Additional testing of grain for GMOs and accompanying certification 
records at each point in the U.S. and international marketing system. 
2)  Added costs of diverting shipments to alternative markets that fail the non-
GMO testing procedures at ports.  These costs could range up to 30 to 40 
cents per rejected bushel, when costs of transportation to distant feed 
markets are included. 
3)  Loss of large-volume rail transportation discounts that can easily amount to 
$0.10 to $0.15 per bushel.* 
4)  Possible costs of cleaning port elevator facilities that have been accidentally 
contaminated with GMO wheat. 
5)  Partial loss of country elevator efficiencies and economies of scale. 
 
23 As one example of economies of scale in transportation, 110 car shuttle trains are the 
latest rail transport system in the Corn Belt, and provide freight cost reductions of up to 
20 cents per bushel for an 800 mile shipment, vs. 100 car rates to the same location.
∗
 
The $0.21 per bushel additional cost is an assumed cost that appears to be within a 
realistic range when the above factors are considered and under some conditions could 
be quite conservative.  It is based in part on non-GMO soybean segregation cost 
estimates developed by USDA from a survey of 84 elevators that placed non-GMO 
segregation costs at $0.22 and $0.54 per bushel respectively for corn and soybeans 
(Lin, et. al. 2000).  These costs do not include premiums paid to farmers or added 
overseas testing costs, and will vary from one elevator to another with variations in 
facilities and the volume handled.  (For additional discussion of segregation or other 
dual marketing system costs, see Smyth, et. al., 2003, and Herrman, et. al., 1999.) 
 
A recent North Dakota State University study provides estimates of some handling and 
testing costs at country elevators for a dual marketing system where non-GMO 
tolerances are moderate and elevators apparently already have existing dual dump pit, 
conveyor, and load-out systems to avoid contamination and clean-out expenses or the 
system is achieved by multi-location firms designating individual facilities for handling 
only non-GMO grain (Wilson & Dahl, October 2002). The authors estimated total 
segregation costs with an optimal strategy at 3.36 cents per bushel, testing every fifth 
load of incoming grain. 
 
Under this system, in addition to costs identified by the authors, a number of 
significant additional costs and “hidden costs” almost certainly would be involved. 
These include farmer expenses for added waiting time and hauling the crop longer 
distances than at the present time, and likely loss of economies of scale in grain 
elevator and transportation costs through lower handling volumes and storage bins not 
being fully utilized (Maltsbarger, et. al., 2000).  Lin, et. al. also cites National Grain 
and Feed Association estimates that, at a 1-percent or lower tolerance level for biotech 
content, roughly 5 percent of the nation's elevators can achieve segregation without 
major new investments. 
 
Canadian researchers find cross-pollination and volunteer wheat to be a substantial co-
mingling problem when the same field and adjoining fields raise wheat over a multi-
year period, particularly when the crop is herbicide-resistant and non-GMO market 
tolerances are low.  A low level of contamination may occur initially along the edges of 
fields that border GMO wheat fields.  This wheat, in turn produces volunteer wheat 
that contaminates a larger area of the field the next year.  Over a series of years, the 
researchers find that contamination is potentially a serious problem.  The Canadian 
researchers also indicate it is a potentially serious problem for seed producers in that it 
may cause GMO wheat contamination of non-GMO seed wheat, thus compounding 
segregation challenges (Brûlé-Babel1).  This problem becomes more serious with the 
                                                 
∗ Personal communication with Dr. C. Phillip Baumel, Distinguished Professor of Agriculture, Professor 
of Economics, and agricultural transportation specialist at Iowa State University.  
 
24 recognition that many wheat growers save seed from current production for planting 
the next year.  That is a practice that non-GMO wheat producers would expect to 
continue to use if GMO wheat is commercialized.  Experience with soybeans, another 
self-pollinating plant, also indicates this risk is not insignificant and may well be due to 
accidental low-level co-mingling at seed processing plants and/or growth of volunteer 
herbicide-resistant soybeans in seed fields.  Seed plants typically have extensive 
conveyor systems and other mechanisms where low-level contamination may be a risk.  
Because of these problems, major seed companies indicate they cannot guarantee that 
U.S. corn and soybean seed sold as non-GMO varieties is 100 % non-GMO. 
 
Experiences with StarLink® corn, organic soybeans, and pharmaceutical corn in Iowa and 
Nebraska, all of which represented much less than one percent of total crop acreage, suggest 
the challenges of meeting foreign buyer non-GMO wheat contract specifications are likely to 
require a stringent market segregation system.  Other costs that likely would be involved in 
such a system include additional expenses to clean-out legs and conveyor systems, waiting 
time for producers as the elevator shifts from receiving loads of GMO wheat to receiving 
non-GMO wheat, possible investment costs at elevators for additional dump pits and separate 
conveyor systems to insure non-co-mingling, added segregation costs at U.S. port elevators, 
and added testing and segregation costs beyond the receiving port elevators in the country 
receiving and using the non-GMO grain.  For additional work on costs of segregating or 
identity preservation of non-GMO grain, see (Lin et. al., 2000; Gosnell, 2001). 
 
 
Non-GMO Premiums on the Tokyo Grain Exchange Show Large Segregation Costs 
 
A further indication that when all costs from producer to end user are included, GMO wheat 
segregation costs to prevent low-level GMO contamination are likely to be several times the 
level indicated in the low-cost study cited above comes from price premiums of the non-
GMO soybean futures contract on the Tokyo Grain Exchange (TGE) vs. the GMO soybean 
futures contract.  Both contracts specify No. 2 yellow soybeans produced in Ohio, Michigan, 
and Indiana as the deliverable commodity, but also provide for soybeans from Iowa, Illinois, 
and Wisconsin to be delivered.  The delivery points are designated warehouses in Tokyo, 
Kanagawa, Chiba, and Saitama, with no discount for Iowa, Illinois, or Wisconsin soybeans.  
(Tokyo Grain Exchange [TGE] Web site: http://www.tge.or.jp/ ). 
 
The TGE non-GMO soybean futures contracts began trading on May 18, 2000.  GMO 
soybeans have been commercially available in large quantities in the U.S. for the past four 
years.  The average premium of all TGE non-GMO soybean futures (for all delivery months 
combined) over TGE GMO soybean futures contracts during the month of December of 2002 
was $1.033 per bushel.  Premiums vary over time with changing market conditions, and 
influences such as the availability of Brazilian non-GMO soybeans to meet user needs and 
length of time to the delivery period.  Economic theory indicates that with efficient, 
competitive markets, if a dual marketing system capable of meeting Japanese buyer needs 
had been possible at costs of only a few cents per bushel, the market would have had 
sufficient time to force non-GMO vs. GMO soybean futures price differentials down to that 
cost level by late 2002.  Other empirical evidence of substantial cost involved in developing a 
25 dual marketing system comes from the Canada’s loss of the EU canola market, and the U.S. 
loss of the EU corn market.  In both cases, if a dual marketing system had been available to 
meet the low tolerances of foreign buyers at low cost, it should have emerged in the years 
after these crops were introduced commercially in the U.S. and Canada. 
 
 
Summary Comments About Segregation Costs 
 
There is uncertainty about the precise cost of a dual marketing system, whether it will work 
effectively with stringent foreign buyer requirements, or whether an identity preservation 
system would be required to reduce to near zero the chance of accidental GMO 
contamination.   A key point to keep in mind is that if even modest additional costs are 
involved in marketing non-GMO U.S. wheat, foreign buyers will have incentive to look for 
alternative suppliers who do not produce GMO wheat.  That tendency will be reinforced by 
foreign food processors, who do not want to risk alienating customers with possible 
accidental co-mingling of GMO and non-GMO wheat in their products. 
 
In considering segregated or identity-preserved marketing systems, it is important to 
consider the challenges of low foreign GMO tolerance.  In China’s labeling system, the 
tolerance level is zero.  In the EU, it currently is one percent and is expected to soon be 
lowered to 0.9 percent.  A 0.9% tolerance level would be reached with only 90 kernels of 
wheat in 10,000 kernels.  For unapproved GMO varieties, the official EU labeling tolerance 
is expected to remain at 0.5%, although buyers might well require a lower tolerance level.  A 
segregated or identity-preserved marketing system would need adequate precision to prevent 
contamination of non-GMO wheat with GMO varieties above these levels. Without a 
segregated handling system, a small amount of wheat left in an elevator leg or dump pit after 
unloading GMO wheat could easily cause rejection of a shipment of grain, an entire bin at an 
elevator, or could shut-down a processing plant, even if tests of samples from incoming loads 
were confirmed to be non-GMO wheat.  Even with the best of systems, such rejection is 
almost certain to occur at times and must be considered in the costs of segregation, unless 
there are completely segregated dual handling systems.  Dual systems likely would require 
duplication of some investments and loss of economies of scale. 
 
 
Long-Term Trend in U.S. Share of World Wheat Exports 
 
In considering the potential impact of GMO wheat commercialization on the U.S. 
competitive position in world markets, it is important to note the long-term trend in the U.S. 
world market share, as shown in Figure 8.  Competition in world wheat markets intensified in 
the 1980s and 1990s and remains highly competitive.  The U.S. share of the world wheat 
export market has fallen from the 40 to 49 percent range in the 1970s and early 1980s to the 
low 20 percent range in the past year.  Current trends indicate competition in this market  
26 may increase in the years ahead as Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union continue 
their transitions to market 
economies and increased wheat 
exports.  The 2003-04 marketing 
year may be a temporary exception 
to this trend because of the worst 
winter-kill damage in nearly a 
century and severe drought in parts 
of the former Soviet Union. 
 
Competitiveness in international 
markets has several dimensions, 
including price, dependability of 
supplies, and quality.  The quality 
dimension clearly will include non-
GMO vs. GMO when GMO wheat is commercialized.  Since wheat is produced in many 
parts of the world, non-GMO supplies are likely to be readily available to foreign buyers in 
the next two to six years, at highly competitive prices.  For the U.S. to maintain or enhance 
its share of world wheat exports, it will be important to provide consumers with the quality of 
wheat they desire at competitive prices.  
 
If the U.S. attempts to supply world markets with both GMO and non-GMO wheat from the 
same producing regions, foreign consumers will be faced with the following question.  
“Should I buy non-GMO U.S. wheat at a premium price that includes the costs of 
segregation and certification, or can I get similar wheat from other suppliers without 
paying segregation costs?”  A segregation premium and/or lack of non-GMO supplies in the 
U.S. would create foreign incentives to increase investment in over-seas wheat producing 
areas to create alternative sources of supply, in a pattern similar to the one that occurred in 
Brazil in recent decades (Warnken, P.F., 1999).  Several former Soviet republics have 
expanded grain production rapidly in the last five years, and are modernizing their marketing 
systems, including large new investments for exporting facilities on the Black Sea.  Some 
estimates indicate that as much as 37 to 73 million more acres of good cropland could be 
brought into production in these countries in the next few years.  Much of this land is likely 
to be used for wheat production.  Farm level production costs in parts of this region are 
estimated to be as low as $0.98 to $1.22 per bushel (McKee, August 2002, p. 37). 
 
 
Potential Export Market & Price Impacts on Hard Red Spring and Durum Wheat 
 
Our market-loss scenarios are based on the assumption that in the short-run (2 to 6 years), 
alternative non-GMO supplies will be readily available in other countries, without the need 
for segregation expenses.  At this writing, this appears to be a valid assumption for the short 
run, although it may not be valid in a longer-run time frame.  Table 1 shows the estimated 
millions of bushels of negative impacts on U.S. hard red spring wheat exports, total demand 
for this class of wheat, and potential price impacts for the three scenarios previously outlined.   
 
27 In each case, loss of export markets forces excess wheat supplies into the domestic feed 
market in competition with corn and other feed grains.  Large feedlots are not present in most 
of the northern Great Plains of the U.S.  Feed wheat prices likely would also be depressed by 
the cost of shipping excess wheat to intensive livestock feeding areas further south.  These 
costs could be partially offset by the higher feeding value of wheat than corn.  But it should 
also be noted that the Northern Plains region would face intense competition from emerging 
innovations in very large, low-cost shuttle-train corn shipments noted earlier that are being 
used to move corn into these same feeding areas.  The 110-car shuttle trains haul almost half-
a-million bushels at a time, and must be loaded and ready to move out from the originating 
elevator in 17 hours.  Additional competition would come from competitively priced 
distiller’s grain and solubles (DGS) from more than two dozen new ethanol plants under 
construction and/or just coming into operation, along with more plants that will be built in 
the next few years.  The distiller’s grain has about twice the protein content (dry matter basis) 
that is contained in ordinary protein hard red wheat, as well as considerable energy.  This 
product is priced at about the same price per ton as corn.   
 
Table 2 shows potential export and price impact comparisons for durum wheat.  The EU and 
non-Egyptian North African markets are especially important to U.S. durum wheat producers 
since they accounted for about 88% of U.S. durum wheat exports in 2001-02.  Strong 
negative reactions to GMO wheat appear likely in both of these markets.  Judging from the 
StarLink® experience where co-mingling with other types of corn caused widespread market 
rejections, this analysis is based on the premise that similar problems would be likely to 
occur with durum wheat.  While the GMO wheat is not expected to have the allergenic 
concerns that were associated with StarLink® corn, buyer preferences in these two durum 
market areas appear strong enough to produce similar rejection, and the StarLink® 
experience shows the high risk of contamination of non-GMO supplies with GMO grain. 
 
In this part of the analysis we assume U.S. commercial GMO varieties are restricted to spring 
wheat, that U.S. consumer attitudes toward GMO wheat are positive, and that foreign buyers 
will continue to buy other classes of U.S. wheat produced outside of the Northern Plains.  
Later in the report, we examine export market destinations and risk exposure for other classes 
of wheat.  U.S. consumer acceptance would encourage some substitution of hard red spring 
wheat for other classes of wheat in the domestic milling market, thereby slightly tempering 
the impact on spring wheat prices but lowering the price of other types of wheat.  At the 
same time, such substitution would risk co-mingling of HRS wheat with other classes in the 










28 Table 1.  Estimated Hard Red Spring Wheat Short-Run Export and Price Impacts from 

















HRS Wheat * 
Scenario I    88  43%  16.5%  -33% 
Scenario II    67  33%  12.6%  -32% 
Scenario III  110  52%  20.7%  -35% 
* In the short run, Hard Red Spring Wheat is priced as feed wheat because of surplus volume from lost exports 
being forced into domestic markets. 
 
 
Table 2.  Estimated Durum Wheat Short-Run Export and Price Impacts from 
Commercialization of GMO Spring Wheat in the U.S. 
 
  











Scenario I  32  82%  26%  -32% 
Scenario II  28  71%  23%  -32% 





Demand for most farm products is highly inelastic.  For this analysis of short-run impacts, we 
used a domestic food wheat price elasticity of demand of –0.3 for other hard red spring wheat 
and –0.2 for durum wheat.  An inelastic demand in domestic markets means that as supplies 
are increased by forcing normal exports back into domestic markets, the price goes down by 
a greater percentage than the increase in domestically available supply.  In other words, a 
large decrease in price is needed for the domestic market to absorb supplies that normally 
would be marketed outside of the U.S. 
 
Under all three scenarios, price elasticities of demand for domestic food use for both classes 
of wheat would have lowered prices well below those for corn and other feed grains in an 
unsuccessful effort to generate enough increased U.S. milling demand to use the supply 
formerly going to export markets.  In the process, these types of wheat would be expected to 
become attractive to livestock feeders.  Thus, feed markets would be expected to set the price 
of both durum and hard red spring wheat and would absorb the excess supply.  As other 
evidence of potential large negative effects on wheat prices, an extensive Canadian study of 
GMO commercialization and various export market scenarios for different qualities of 
Canadian wheat found a potential 58 percent decline in revenue for the highest quality of 
Canadian wheat (Kuntz, 2001). 
 
 
29 Impact on Other Crops 
 
Loss of export markets and forcing of increased supplies of U.S. durum and other spring 
wheat into feed markets in the short-run would likely have small negative impacts on prices 
of corn, feed barley, and other feed grains—provided foreign buyers continue to accept other 
classes of U.S. wheat.  The potential volumes of lost spring wheat exports are small in 
comparison with the total quantity of corn (the dominant feed grain) fed in the U.S.  Our 
estimates show potential negative corn price impacts of around two to three percent or about 
four to six cents per bushel in the short run, provided foreign buyers continue to purchase 
other classes of U.S. wheat in the same quantities as currently. 
 
 
Government Program Impacts 
 
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 provides crop producers with three 
types of income safety-net mechanisms.  Price levels do not influence one type, Direct 
Payments.  The other two, Loan Deficiency Payments (LDPs) and Counter-Cyclical 
Payments (CCPs), are triggered by low spot and marketing-year average prices, respectively.  
Current legislation provides for this system to be in effect through the 2007 crop year.  In the 
case of wheat, CCPs are based on the marketing year average price of all wheat, not on prices 
for individual classes of wheat.  If most of the weakness in wheat prices stemming from 
commercialization of GMO wheat is in the HRS and durum markets, the national average 
price for all wheat would be less depressed than that for HRS.  HRS wheat makes up 
approximately one-fourth of total U.S. wheat production.  As a result, HRS and durum wheat 
growers might receive only partial compensation for a GMO-induced price decline through 
increased government payments. 
 
 
Risk of Export Losses for Other Classes of Wheat 
 
Along with hard red spring and durum wheat, there are three other major classes of U.S. 
wheat: white, hard red winter, and soft red winter wheat.  White wheat producers are 
substantially more dependent on export demand than producers of the other two types of 
wheat, although exports are very 
important to all three classes of 
wheat.  In the 2001-02 marketing 
year ending May 31, 2002, 
exports accounted for an 
estimated 61 percent of total use 
of U.S. white wheat (WW).  That 
compares with 43 percent for hard 
red winter wheat (HRW) and 44 
percent for soft red winter wheat 
(SRW).  For the 2002-03 
marketing year, the percentage 
accounted for by exports was 
about unchanged for WW and 
30 HRW, but was down sharply for SRW.  Impacts of de-regulation and commercialization of 
GMO hard red spring wheat on hard and soft red winter wheat are more uncertain than for 
HRS because of differing market destinations, fewer exports to countries that label foods 
containing GMO ingredients, and possible differences in intensity of foreign consumer 
reactions to GMO wheat in the relevant markets.  It is not the purpose of this report to 
provide detailed projections of precise impacts on the other classes of wheat, but to provide 
a general idea of the risk exposure that may exist for these crops, assuming that Round-
Up® Ready HRS wheat is commercialized in the next few years.  Export risk exposure will 
also depend on the ability of the U.S. marketing system to avoid co-mingling of GMO HRS 
wheat with the other classes.   Prices also will be affected by attitudes of domestic millers 
toward use of GMO wheat in their plants.  If domestic millers use GMO wheat in their 
plants, risk of co-mingling GMO HRS supplies with other classes of wheat will be increased.  
Control of co-mingling probably will be more difficult with white wheat than with hard and 
soft red winter wheat because white wheat uses the same export marketing system as much 
of the HRS wheat.  However, HRW wheat would be at some risk of co-mingling and hence 
rejection by foreign buyers that desire to avoid GMO wheat.  The co-mingling risk is present 
because of production in southern areas of the Northern Plains that may move through the 
same marketing system as spring wheat.  Also, if domestic millers readily accept GMO 
wheat, risk of co-mingling could occur as millers bring spring wheat to their plants through 
the marketing system used for HRW wheat. 
 
Major export market destinations vary considerably from one type of wheat to another 
because of the different types of products that are made from them, as shown in Figures 9, 
10, and 11.  White wheat export markets are primarily in Asia, with almost no exports to 
Europe, and very few to the Western Hemisphere and Africa.  Consumer response to GMO 
wheat in Yemen, Indonesia, Egypt, and the Western Hemisphere appears likely to be much 
less negative than in other major export destinations.  These countries (most of which do not 
label GMO foods) accounted for about 30 percent of U.S. white wheat exports in 2001-02 or 
about 21 percent of combined domestic and foreign use of that type of U.S. wheat. 
 
Hard red winter wheat exports go to a wide range of non-European destinations on four 
continents.  Soft red winter wheat 
typically is the lowest priced U.S. 
wheat and goes primarily to 
developing nations in Africa, Latin 
America, and Oceania, along with a 
modest amount to EU.  For both WW 
and HRW exports, one should note 
that some Arab nations have 
prohibited the sale of GMO food in 
their countries, and Saudi Arabia 
labels food products containing 
GMOs.  That fact adds uncertainty to 
foreign market acceptance of GMO 
wheat.  We are assuming that the 
31 Arab countries identified here will readily accept these classes of wheat, despite risk of co-
mingling with GMO wheat. 
 
Of these three types of wheat, white wheat appears to be at greatest risk of market losses if 
Round-Up Ready® hard red spring wheat is de-regulated and commercialized.  About 
seventy percent of its exports go to countries that label food containing GMO ingredients, 
and over 60 percent of the demand for this type of wheat comes from export markets.  U.S. 
Wheat Associates survey data indicate buyers in most of these destinations are opposed to 
use of GMO wheat in their plants (U.S. Wheat Associates, op. cit.). 
 
The class of U.S. wheat with least risk of market loss from commercialization of GMO 
HRS wheat appears to be soft red wheat.  Only about 28% of U.S. exports of this class of 
wheat go to markets currently labeling or soon expecting to label food containing GMO 
ingredients.  Even so, this is a significant part of total demand for this type of wheat.  Also 
lowering the risk for SRW 
wheat exports is the fact 
that it is produced mainly 
in the eastern Corn Belt, 
South Central, and South 
Eastern U.S.  Wheat 
produced in these regions 
typically does not move 
through the same 
marketing system as HRS 
wheat.  Accordingly, risks 
of co-mingling SRW and 
HRS wheat in the 
marketing system are 
relatively low.  One 
unknown in assessing risks 
of market loss for both 
HRW and SRW is whether developing nations in Africa would accept SRW wheat if HRS is 
commercialized in the U.S. in the next few years.  Several African countries rejected U.S. 
GMO corn food aid shipments in 2002.  According to some sources, the rejection was 
because the countries feared GMO corn would be used for seed and would contaminate 
domestic production, part of which is exported to EU. 
 
Table 3 shows potential bushel losses of export demand and percentages of total demand for 
white wheat, using the same assumptions as were used earlier about market acceptance for 
HRS and Durum wheat, and using the same domestic food elasticity of demand as for HRS 
wheat.  A parallel assumption is that with commercialization of GMO HRS wheat, foreign 
buyers would view U.S. WW as being very susceptible to co-mingling at low levels with 
HRS wheat, and thus at risk of containing some GMO wheat.  Indicators that this may be a 
realistic assumption include (1) the fact that WW moves mainly through the same Pacific 
Northwest U.S. grain marketing system as does a substantial amount of HRS U.S. wheat, and  
(2) trade reports recently indicated that current U.S. wheat exports contain some fragments of  
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Table 3.  Possible White Wheat Short-Run Export and Price Impacts from 

















HRS Wheat  
Scenario I    32  28%  13.4%  -26% * 
Scenario II    20  17%  8.4%  -26% * 
Scenario III    44  37%  18.1%  -26% * 
* In the short run, White Wheat is priced as feed wheat because of surplus volume in domestic markets from 
lost exports.  
 
 
Table 4.  Possible Hard Red Winter Wheat Short-Run Export and Price Impacts from 

















HRW Wheat  
Scenario I    44  14%  5.4%        -18% # 
Scenario II    27  9%  3.4%        -11% # 
Scenario III    55  17%  6.7%  -22% * 
#  Because of the potential blending of HRS wheat with this class of wheat in domestic milling operations, the 
actual decline in prices could be greater than shown here. 
* In the short run, Hard Red Winter Wheat is priced as feed wheat because of surplus volume from lost exports.  
 
 
Table 5. Possible Soft Red Winter Wheat Short-Run Export and Price Impacts from 

















SRW Wheat  
Scenario I    21  11%  4.6%  -15% * 
Scenario II    20  10%  4.4%  -15% * 
Scenario III    39  20%  8.5%  -18% * 
* In the short run, Soft Red Wheat is priced as feed wheat because of surplus volume from lost exports.  Note, 
however, that a low-cost or no-cost dual marketing system may be more workable for this class of wheat than 
others because of the different geographic location of its production.  If that is the case, these negative price 
impacts for SRW wheat could be moderately over-stated. 
 
GMO corn and soybeans because they move through the same marketing system (Reuters, 
June 3, 2003, op. cit.).  GMO corn and soybeans can be removed from the wheat because of 
33 different sizes, shapes, and density of kernels.  But GMO HRS wheat would be very difficult 
to remove from WW. 
 
 
U.S. Wheat Product Exports  
 
American wheat product export volumes are very small when compared to un-processed 
wheat exports.  For the 2002-03 marketing year ending May 31, 2003, U.S. firms exported a 
total of 35,400 tons of these products.  While small relative to the size of the total wheat 
market, these exports may be more significant for some individual firms.  Approximately 70 
percent of the U.S. wheat product exports went to Mexico last year, with most of the 
remainder going to other Latin American countries.  In the last two years, Western 
Hemisphere destinations accounted for 84 to 90 percent of U.S. wheat product exports.  Due 
to the small volume of exports and the destinations to which they are shipped, one should not 
expect risk of foreign buyer rejection of U.S. wheat product exports to create significant risk 
in wheat prices. 
 
 
Summary of Implications for other Classes of Wheat and for Feed Grains 
 
This analysis suggests that in the next one to six years, white wheat would be at substantial 
risk of economically significant export market losses and negative price impacts if GMO 
HRS wheat is soon commercialized in the U.S.  The risk comes in large part from possible 
co-mingling with HRS wheat at port elevators in the Pacific Northwest.  All three market 
scenarios imply that there is considerable risk of U.S. white wheat prices falling to feed-
wheat levels with commercialization of GMO hard red spring wheat.  For hard red winter 
wheat, Scenario III with relatively high segregation costs of a dual marketing system tends to 
create an incentive to invest in increased foreign wheat production, in a manner similar to 
that which began in Brazilian soybeans in the 1970s with ill-fated U.S. grain export 
embargoes (Warnken, op. cit.).  That, in turn pushes HRW prices down to feed wheat levels.  
For this class of wheat, it is possible that a regional segregation system might be used to 
reduce the risk of export market loss.  Under such a system, wheat from the Southern Plains 
might be shipped to export markets that prefer non-GMO wheat, while wheat from areas 
adjoining the spring wheat Belt where co-mingling with GMO wheat is more likely might be 
shipped to countries where GMO wheat is acceptable. 
 
 For SRW, assuming that foreign buyers believe there is considerable risk of co-mingling 
with HRS wheat, there would be some risk that prices for this class of wheat would drop to 
feed wheat levels.  This possibility is shown by the three scenarios in Table 5.  However, the 
export market risk for this class of wheat may be reduced by the fact that SRW wheat is 
produced and marketed in regions of the U.S. where spring wheat is not grown. 
 
 Total bushels of export demand at risk for all classes of wheat, as indicated in the 
scenarios shown here, ranges from approximately160 to 280 million bushels.  In the short 
run, this wheat supply likely would be diverted into feed markets, competing with corn, 
grain sorghum, and feed barley.  Our estimates indicate that based on 2001-02 market 
34 conditions, the extra feed supply would have the potential to weaken corn prices by 
approximately $0.06 to $0.10 per bushel in the short run vs. levels that would be expected 
to occur without the reduced U.S. wheat exports. 
 
For the world wheat market, these potential reductions in U.S. exports of all wheat are 
equivalent to 4.4 to 7.7 percent of USDA’s July 11, 2003 projections of 2003-04 world wheat 
exports.  They represent a potential loss of 16 to 29 percent of USDA’s July 11, 2003 
projected U.S. wheat exports for 2003-04.  That, in turn, would have the potential to lower 
the U.S. share of global wheat exports to around 16 to 19 percent, down from 22.9 percent in 
the marketing year just ended.  The bottom end of this range would be equivalent to 62 
percent of the percentage decline in the U.S. share of world wheat exports occurred from 
1995-96 to 2002-03.  From another perspective, foreign wheat production would need to 
increase by a modest 0.8 to 1.5 percent beyond growth in foreign demand to offset this 
estimated loss of U.S. wheat exports. If classes of U.S. durum and other spring wheat are 
the only ones impacted by commercialization of Round-Up® resistant spring wheat, the 
estimated impacts would be only 50 to 60 percent as large as these numbers indicate . 
 
 
Longer-term U.S. Wheat Production Sector Adjustments to GMO Wheat 
 
The model used here to assess short-term potential price impacts from export market losses is 
not adequate to analyze longer-term adjustments of the wheat sector to the introduction of 
Round-Up® Ready wheat, and long-term analysis is beyond the scope of this study.  
However, the probable direction of longer-term adjustments, provided foreign consumer 
resistance to that type of wheat persists for several years, is outlined here.  An important 
element in the longer-term setting is that in many U.S. wheat export market destinations, 
USDA analysts indicate wheat is an inferior good.  That means for industrialized and newly 
industrializing countries, as incomes rise, consumers tend to consume fewer products 
produced directly from wheat, and more meat, poultry, and sea food.  There are exceptions to 
this pattern, especially in low-income developing nations that consume wheat products as a 
staple food.  Many of these countries tend to rely on classes of wheat other than HRS or 
durum wheat. 
 
Another element in the long-term global wheat market setting is that for many countries, 
wheat yields and production technology have laged substantially behind that of the U.S.  
Also, farmers in former Centrally Planned nations have a learning curve in experiencing how 
to operate their businesses in a market-directed economy.  These two factors suggest that 
foreign wheat production is likely to continue growing more rapidly than that of the U.S. in 
the longer run.  When short-term reluctance of foreign consumers to embrace GMO wheat is 
added to the picture, it suggests that U.S. commercialization of GMO wheat may risk 
accelerating long-term trends that have been in place in the U.S. wheat industry for many 
years unless changes in foreign consumer attitudes occur.  Those trends include: 
• a declining U.S. share of global wheat exports.  
• downward-trending absolute levels of U.S. wheat exports.  
35 • shifts of U.S. wheat cropland to other uses including the U.S. Conservation 
Reserve and Wetland Reserve Programs, forage, pasture, soybeans, canola, 
and feed grains. 
• downward trending wheat prices, both in inflation-adjusted terms and in 
current dollars. 
• declining revenue available from wheat to support rural economies and 
government 
institutions in major 
wheat-growing areas 
 
U.S. wheat exports peaked in 1981-
82, and have trended downward since 
that time (see Wisner, Baumel, et. al., 
2003 for more detail) as shown in 
Figure 12.  Harvested U.S. wheat 
acreage peaked in 1981 at 80.6 
million acres, and declined to 46 
million acres last year, as shown in 
Figure 13. U.S. harvested wheat 
acreage in 2002 was the smallest 
since 1970, and the 6
th smallest since 1909. 
 
Downward pressure on wheat prices stemming from lost export demand would likely make 
wheat an unprofitable crop in some marginal producing areas of the U.S., with prices 
dropping below variable costs of production.
4  
 
Government programs, including Loan Deficiency Payments and subsidized crop insurance 
likely would slightly temper 
this tendency.  But the market 
signal to producers would be 
to produce less wheat.  Over 
time as wheat growers would 
find other alternatives for 
land currently producing 
wheat, prices for wheat would 
likely increase from the initial 
levels occurred in response to 
de-regulation and 
commercialization of Round-
Up® resistant hard red spring 
wheat.  Gross revenue to the 
industry would be expected to 
decline because of fewer 
                                                 
4 Variable costs are costs that would not be incurred if the crop were not planted.  Opportunity costs on owned 
land, farm operator labor, depreciation, and some other costs are incurred whether or not the land is planted. 
These costs are called fixed costs. 
36 acres being planted.  That in turn would reduce revenue to local businesses and government 
institutions in major spring wheat producing areas, unless alternative uses for the land that 
were equally favorable with wheat prior to GMO commercialization could be found. 
 
 
Implications for Wheat Futures Markets and Hedging 
 
Merchandising margins per bushel are very small in grain handling and exporting businesses 
because of strong global competition.  With typically volatile wheat prices, a small change in 
the wheat market could shift a merchandiser’s or exporter’s wheat purchase or sale from a 
profitable transaction to a substantial loss unless appropriate risk-management procedures are 
used.  To prevent that from happening, it is standard business practice for buyers of wheat to 
use the futures market to “hedge” purchases as well as sales to processors, exporters, and 
other users of wheat, or to use contractual arrangements that are based on futures markets.   
 
Hedging is a process for protecting merchandising or processing profits from market 
fluctuations.  It involves taking opposite positions in two wheat markets such as a cash or 
spot market for the physical wheat represented by a purchase from a wheat producer, and a 
sale of a standardized futures market contract for future delivery of the wheat.  In nearly all 
cases, selling the wheat to a buyer at a later time and buying back the futures contract 
through a paper transaction completes the hedge.  The threat of physical delivery on futures 
contracts (though actual delivery is not used to a large extent) forces the futures price to 
reflect realities of the cash or spot market.  The futures transaction thus serves as a temporary 
substitute for a later transaction in the physical wheat market.  This process provides price 
protection because a loss in one market is offset by a gain in the other.   
 
For the hedge to be effective in protecting against price risk, the two markets must reflect a 
value for the same commodity.  Otherwise, a decline in the spot commodity price would not 
be offset by an opposite gain in the futures transaction, or vice versa if the spot commodity 
price would rise.  Accordingly, it is essential to the grain industry, for effective hedging, 
that the cash or spot market and the futures contract both represent the same type of 
wheat.  For this reason, the Minneapolis grain exchange has allowed buyers of spring wheat 
futures contracts, if they so desire, to specify that non-GMO wheat be delivered on their 
contract (Minneapolis Grain Exchange, News Alert, May 9, 2003).  When GMO wheat is 
commercialized, this provision may cause some uncertainty in the wheat price discovery 
process and wheat basis (spot-to-futures price differential) since spring wheat futures sellers 
may not know at the time of the initial transaction whether their contract will be priced as 
GMO or as non-GMO wheat.   
 
The other two U.S. wheat futures markets, the Kansas City Board of Trade and the Chicago 
Board of Trade also may need to make decisions regarding eligibility of GMO vs. non-GMO 
wheat for delivery (Reuters, May 27, 2003).  The former of these two markets offers 
contracts for HRW wheat, while the latter offers contracts for SRW wheat.  If the risk of co-
mingling HRW with HRS is perceived to be low, the Kansas City exchange may decide to 
retain contracts as currently specified.  The Chicago Board of Trade wheat contracts at this 
writing allow delivery of hard red spring wheat (CBOT.com/contract specifications), so the 
37 question of whether to allow delivery of GMO wheat may be an issue for that exchange.  As 
noted earlier, soft red wheat--which is the main type of wheat reflected in CBOT wheat 
futures prices—has the lowest risk of export market losses of any major class of U.S. wheat.  
The low risk comes from its producing region being isolated from the Northern Plains and 
from many of its major export markets being less sensitive to GMO issues than those for 
other classes of wheat. 
 
 
Foreign Wheat Competitors and GMO Wheat 
 
As of mid-year, 2003, the question of whether major competing wheat exporting countries 
will soon commercialize GMO wheat is not known for certain.  Opposition to 
commercialization of GMO wheat is strong in Canada.  The Canadian Wheat Board has 
strongly encouraged Monsanto not to commercialize the wheat there because of high risk of 
loss of export markets (just food.com, June 19, 2003).  The Canadian wheat industry has 
developed a detailed list of requirements that would be necessary to safeguard the industry 
from economic losses if it is commercialized.  In Australia, some provinces have established 
moratoriums on the sale of GMO wheat.  Information about possible production of Round-
UP® Ready wheat in other major wheat producing countries is limited at this time, but we 
are not aware of any movement toward immediate commercialization of GMO wheat by 
other countries.  Risk of export loss is likely to be greatest for the first country to 





This report examines probable short run (two to six year) impacts on U.S. spring wheat 
export markets and prices from the commercialization of GMO hard red spring wheat.  GMO 
crop technology offers possible large benefits to consumers in the future, if plant-breeding 
concepts currently in the development stage materialize.  At this point, however, GMO crops 
are “input trait” crops.  The inserted gene from an unrelated organism is substituted for an 
alternative type of input such as an insecticide or different weed control technology. 
 
Many foreign consumers see nothing to be gained from purchasing food produced from these 
types of crops.  Moreover, many of them have questions about the long-term safety of GMO 
crops, which may or may not have scientific foundations.  Regardless of their scientific 
validity, consumer attitudes determine buying patterns when GMO food labeling programs 
are present, as they are in many foreign markets for U.S. wheat. 
 
Potential export-market impacts from U.S. commercialization of Round-Up Ready® hard red 
spring wheat (HRS) are extremely important to Northern Plains farmers and ranchers, 
exporters, millers, other agribusiness firms, rural communities, and state and local 
government revenues.  Exports are a major market for both HRS and durum wheat. 
Information on consumer attitudes and other patterns reviewed here indicate there is a high 
probability that Round-Up Ready® hard red spring wheat and U.S. durum wheat from the 
Northern Plains would be rejected in the short run by a majority of foreign buyers.  Without 
38 strong exports, excess U.S. production capacity likely would quickly depress prices for these 
classes of wheat to a level causing excess supplies to be used as livestock feed.  Increased 
government program payments from the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 
would be expected to only partially offset a drop in spring wheat prices to this level.  In the 
short-run, increased wheat feeding also would have a slight negative impact on markets for 
feed grains including corn, sorghum, and feed barley. 
 
Some have suggested that the risk of foreign buyer rejection of GMO wheat is low, based on 
continued U.S. exports of GMO corn and soybeans.  However, several differences between 
these crops and wheat should be noted.  First, there are many more alternative suppliers of 
wheat in world markets than for corn and soybeans, and several of these suppliers have been 
rapidly expanding exports.  The U.S. accounts for only about eight percent of world wheat 
production versus 40 to 43 percent for corn and soybeans.  Secondly, most corn and soybean 
products so far have avoided labeling in foreign markets, thus avoiding consumer 
identification.  Vegetable oils and corn sweeteners have not been labeled because the GMO 
protein is removed in processing.  Soybean protein is fed largely to livestock and poultry, as 
is corn.  By being processed through meat animals, large percentages of these two crops have 
avoided GMO labeling.  Even so, the U.S. has lost the EU corn export market in the last four 
years due to commercialization of GMO corn, and also has lost most of the EU Soybean 
meal market.  EU is by far the world’s largest importer of soybean meal and in the past 
frequently has been one of the largest U.S. export markets for soybean meal.  The U.S. corn 
industry also has lost most of the South Korean corn market to non-GMO Chinese corn, 
although it is difficult to quantify the exact role of GMO issues in the loss.  Four years ago, 
South Korea was the second largest U.S. corn export market.  Sales so far (through early July 
2003) in 2002-03 total only 10 million bushels, sharply below the 315 million bushels of U.S. 
exports to that nation in 1994-95.  India and a number of African countries also have rejected 
low-cost GMO corn as food aid.  Canada has lost the EU canola market.  
 
GMO wheat products, in contrast to corn and soybeans, likely would almost all be labeled as 
containing GMOs in the foreign countries that have GMO labeling programs.  Another 
difference between corn and wheat is that losses in U.S. corn exports have been partially 
offset by the rapid growth in domestic demand for ethanol fuel.  For example, corn 
processing use has increased by 488 million bushels since 1998-99, while U.S. corn 
exports during the same period have declined by 381 million bushels.  Growth in the corn 
processing market is in sharp contrast to the slow growth in U.S. domestic demand for 
wheat, and the more limited ability of the wheat market to absorb the impact of reduced 
exports.  Another important difference between corn and spring wheat is that about 17% of 
the demand for U.S. corn comes from exports vs. 40% for spring wheat. 
 
Available evidence suggests that one would have to be very optimistic to assume that in the 
next two to six years, the majority of foreign consumers would readily purchase food 
products made from GMO wheat.  At least 37 nations currently label food that contains 
GMO ingredients above a prescribed threshold level.  Another ten to twelve countries are 
expected to implement labeling programs in the next few years.  Recent ratification of the 
Global Biosafety Protocol appears likely to encourage additional labeling.  Current labeling 
threshold levels range from zero to five percent of a food’s total ingredients, although 
39 individual food processors may have more restrictive standards.  Labeling does not prevent 
the U.S. from exporting GMO products to these nations, but it does provide a mechanism that 
consumers can use to communicate their desires through the market.  EU surveys of 
consumers, a 2002 U.S. Wheat Associates, Inc. survey of oriental buyer and consumer 
attitudes toward GMOs, a Canadian Wheat Board survey, recent developments in EU GMO 
policies, and problems with U.S. GMO corn and Canadian canola all are indicators of 
potential very poor response to GMO wheat in many export markets at this time and 
probably for the next few years. 
 
These indicators strongly suggest there is high risk that, in the short run, U.S. wheat 
exports would be seriously and negatively impacted by the introduction of GMO wheat.  
Concerns of foreign consumers center around food and environmental safety questions and 
perceived inadequacy of U.S. GMO testing and approval processes.  There also is concern 
about the difficulty of reversing GMO technology once it is introduced and the concentrated 
ownership of GMO patents on the major world crops among a very small and declining 
number of global firms.  Existing and prospective patents cover major components of the 
world’s food supply, namely corn, soybeans, canola, wheat, and rice.  It is not the purpose of 
this report to determine whether these concerns are warranted.  However, it is essential to 
recognize that consumer attitudes are the driving force in markets, regardless of whether 
or not they are scientifically valid. 
 
Some authors estimate that the current grain marketing system can easily be converted to a 
dual marketing system where GMO and non-GMO wheat simultaneously move through the 
same facilities without serious co-mingling problems or foreign buyer rejection.  Those who 
support this view conclude that the current high-volume, rapid receiving, rapid load-out 
system, and port receiving system could be operated as a dual system at very minimal extra 
cost, without jeopardizing foreign buyer and consumer acceptance of U.S. wheat.  However, 
there is substantial disagreement on costs and feasibility of transforming the current 
marketing system in this way.  A closely related issue is whether GMO and non-GMO seed 
production and marketing can be segregated with adequate precision to prevent 
contamination of non-GMO wheat with GMO supplies.  Experiences with other crops and 
Canadian research on wheat indicate it may be a major challenge to segregate seed supplies 
with adequate precision to meet the low GMO labeling thresholds of some countries, and to 
prevent the GMO wheat technology from becoming a non-reversible technology. 
 
As evidence of the difficulties and costs in developing a dual marketing mechanism, we note 
the failure of such a system to emerge for corn, U.S. soybean meal, and canola on a scale that 
would have prevented the loss of the EU markets for these crops.  The substantial premiums 
for non-GMO soybean futures in Tokyo, Japan also should be noted.  These conditions imply 
that creation of a minimal-cost dual marketing system capable of meeting buyer non-GMO 
wheat specifications would be a major challenge and would involve substantial cost. 
 
The U.S. last year produced an estimated eight percent of the world’s wheat crop.  If costs for 
a dual marketing system are substantial, foreign buyers will have incentive to originate their 
wheat in other areas where the remaining 92 percent of the world’s wheat is produced, and 
(in the short run) probably without incurring the full extra costs of a dual marketing system.  
40 Extra costs of segregated non-GMO wheat would provide a price incentive for other 
countries to expand non-GMO wheat production. 
 
Other critical U.S. and international issues linked to commercialization of GMO wheat 
involve legal liability questions related to who is responsible in case of economic losses from 
cross-pollination, accidental contamination of seed, co-mingling of non-GMO and GMO 
grain in grain or food marketing channels, and at processing plants.  Organic wheat producers 
are very concerned about liability issues involved if their crops are contaminated from 
neighboring GMO fields and cause loss of markets and income.  Their concern, in part, is 
due to the nearly total loss of western Canada’s organic canola production, as well as 
antidotal reports from organic corn and soybean producers of loss of organic certification and 
markets due to accidental GMO contamination (Brasher, op. cit.). 
 
Consumer attitudes and segregation costs are key factors pointing to high risk of lost export 
markets if GMO spring wheat is introduced in the near future.  Serious efforts to address 
consumer concerns and/or provide wheat consumers with products that would offer them 
noticeable health benefits could lower these risks in the next few years. 
 
Limited analysis of export destinations for other classes of wheat and marketing channel 
considerations indicate some risk of export loss also would be present for these crops if 
Round-Up® Ready hard red spring wheat is de-regulated and commercialized.  The greatest 
risk would be for white wheat produced in the Pacific Northwest of the U.S.  About 60 
percent of the production of this type of wheat is exported, much of it to higher income 
countries in Eastern Asia that label food containing GMO ingredients.  Most U.S. ports 
handling these exports also handle HRS wheat and would have a risk of low-level 
contamination with some HRS GMO wheat.  The class of wheat at lowest risk of export loss 
from commercialization of U.S. GMO HRS wheat appears to be soft red winter wheat.  This 
crop is produced primarily in the eastern Corn Belt, South Central, and southeastern U.S.  
Most of its exports typically do not move through the same ports as HRS wheat.  Many of its 
export destinations are developing nations that do not label GMO foods.  Even so, nearly 
one-fourth of its exports go to GMO labeling countries, where there would be some risk of 
lost exports if buyers perceived that a risk of co-mingling with GMO wheat existed.  Hard 
red winter wheat falls between white wheat and soft red winter wheat in its level of risk 
exposure.  Some of its exports go to GMO labeling countries, where there would be risk of 
loss of export markets.  However, a large part of its exports go through marketing facilities 
and ports that do not handle HRS wheat.  Risk of market-channel co-mingling HRS and 
HRW wheat would be increased if domestic millers would blend these two types of wheat in 
domestic milling operations  Thus, its risk of contamination through co-mingling with HRS 
or durum wheat would be lower than with white wheat, but would not be zero. 
 
There is high risk that introduction of GMO hard red spring wheat initially would sharply 
reduce prices for HRS, durum, and very possibly white wheat, as well as other classes of 
wheat.  For wheat diverted from exports to domestic markets, the main alternative would be 
for feed use, at prices competing with corn and other feed grains.  Potential short-run 
volumes of diversion of U.S. hard red spring and durum wheat from export markets to feed 
use in this study, if Round-Up Ready
® wheat is commercialized in the next few years ranged 
41 from 95 to 144 million bushels.  The added competition from wheat would be expected to 
reduce corn prices by about four to six cents per bushel, provided all other market factors 
remain constant.  If foreign customers perceive that co-mingling of GMO wheat is likely for 
all five classes of U.S. wheat, up to 160 to 280 million bushels might be diverted from 
exports to feed use.  Market shifts of this size would tend to reduce the average farm price of 
U.S. corn by six to ten cents per bushel, if all other market factors remain constant.  To offset 
the potential loss of U.S. hard red spring and durum exports, foreign wheat production would 
need to increase by a very slight 0.4 to 0.9 percent beyond the growth in foreign demand. 
 
With a time lag, lower wheat prices likely would cause a reduction in U.S. planted wheat 
acreage, especially in areas where yields are relatively low and production risk is substantial.  
Over time, reduced U.S. wheat plantings and possibly a gradual increase in foreign consumer 
acceptance of GMO wheat would tend to move wheat prices to 1999-02 levels, but at the cost 
of a further down-sizing of the industry.  This adjustment would also be expected to cause a 
shift of wheat acreage to oilseeds, feed grains, forage, pasture, and idling of land in long-term 
Conservation and Wetland Reserve Programs. 
 
There is an important role for additional work to continue monitoring foreign consumer 
attitudes toward GMO food.  Wheat producer groups have asked the USDA, Foreign 
Agriculture Service to use its overseas offices to conduct an extensive assessment of foreign 
consumer attitudes toward such food.  The Foreign Agriculture Service has field offices in 
most foreign countries, and such information could provide a more complete and periodically 
updated picture of foreign consumer views concerning GMO wheat.  Another important role 
for additional work is in development of lower-cost dual or identity-preserved marketing 
systems, and in prevention of contamination of non-GMO seed with GMO seed.  If the 
promises of biotechnology materialize and a number of different types of grains emerge that 
are tailored to specific consumer and/or processor needs, market segregation will be needed 
even if GMO crops become widely accepted by consumers. 
 
 
A Key Question 
 
A key question for the entire non-GMO, organic, and potential GMO wheat industry and 
rural communities dependent on wheat is whether possible gains from reduced wheat 
production costs are great enough to offset potential acceleration of negative long-term 
trends in the industry by neglecting important aspects of consumer demand.  The long-
term trends include declining U.S. exports and U.S. share of world wheat exports, 
declining current dollar and inflation-adjusted prices for wheat, and declining U.S. wheat 
acreage.  U.S. wheat exports in 2002-03 were the lowest since 1971-72, despite sharp 
drought-induced reductions in competition from Canada and Australia.  This question 
should be considered very carefully in light of the extreme difficulty of reversing the GMO 
technology once it has been introduced into the U.S. wheat industry.  
 
These conditions present a major dilemma for the wheat industry and government regulators.  
On the one hand, firms have made large investments to develop genetically modified wheat, 
and the technology suggests that greater gains may be available in the future.  But to capture 
42 those future gains, a return on past investments is needed.  The other horn of the dilemma is 
on the market demand side.  When available evidence of foreign consumer reactions to GMO 
wheat is examined, a logical conclusion is that capturing those returns at this time would 
create substantial risks for the entire industry, some risk for closely related industries 
including the feed grain sector, and risks for local communities and governments in the 
Spring Wheat Belt.  These risks may diminish in the future as consumer attitudes change.  
Attitude change likely could be accelerated by developing products with clear benefits to 
consumers, and by more seriously listening to and addressing consumer concerns. 
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